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Chapter 1 
 
Let us now reflect on how different they are from Europeans; the one is white, the other 
black. This cloaths himself, the other goes half naked. This shudders at the thought of 
eating carrion, the other prepares it as a dainty. Moreover these people are famous, and 
were even from their first appearance in Europe, for being plunderers, thieves and 
incendiaries: so that the European not only dislikes, but hates them. For the above reasons, 
Europeans have always driven the Gipsies away from them, and it is only a few simple 
people, who have made a nearer acquaintance, in order to consult them in matters of 
superstition.  
Heinrich Grellman, Die Zigeuner, translated by Matthew Raper, (1783):xv. 
 
Roma are not Roma, but igani. igani are thieves, criminals, pickpockets etc. igani are 
a migratory people who migrated here from India. They have no culture - Survey 
respondent. 
Shannon Woodcock,“Romania and EUrope: Roma, Rroma and  Tigani as sites for the 
contestation of ethno-national identities,”(2007):54. 
 
Introduction 
To the many in Central and Eastern Europe, Gypsies are the ultimate Other. This view of 
Roma is deeply entrenched and has been present in European conceptualizations of Gypsies for 
almost a thousand years. At times, Gypsies are romantically depicted as free from societal 
pressures, wanderers who live without the stresses of daily life; other times, they are seen as 
vagabonds and thieves, pathological in their rejection of social norms. The Gypsy subject, as 
viewed by non-Gypsies, has a “strange dual identity, where anti-Gypsyism– rooted in racism– 
meets the Gypsy of the romantic imagination” (Beissinger 2001:25); in either construction, 
Gypsies are not seen as part of the social body but oppositional to non-Gypsy Europeans.  Yet 
how to define Gypsies when they are not difference itself remains unclear; definitions of who is 
Roma, what constitutes them as a group, and the characteristics that are attributed to them 
continues to change in concert with sociopolitical changes in the surrounding society.  
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Ethnonyms: Gypsy or Roma? 
The ethnonyms ‘Gypsy’ and ‘Roma’ both have political histories and ‘Gypsy,’ in 
particular, has profoundly negative connotations. Since my thesis is focused on Roma politics, 
and based in field research amongst Roma in Romania, I pay particular attention to the use of 
both Gypsy and Roma in my analysis of that data. The term Roma is generally considered 
politically correct, yet for many of my informants that ethnonym is seen as a political identity 
and not an identity that is relevant to them. When referring to interviews, then, I use the English 
translation of whatever ethnonym was used by that particular interviewee. When my informants 
use the Romanian singular rom or plural romi, I translate it as Roma. When my informants use 
the Romanian terms igan or igani, I translate them as Gypsy. When not directly referencing 
interviews, I will alternate between the use of Roma and Gypsy to convey the contestation over 
these terms as part of the political struggle of Roma mobilization in Romania. 
Situating my argument in context 
Since the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, social and economic factors 
have combined to reconstitute an internationally recognized ‘Roma Problem.’ Since the political 
change, Gypsies have begun to mobilize aid initiatives as well as political parties. Gypsies are 
free to pursue ethno-political mobilization. By Roma ethno-political mobilization, I mean the 
process by which Roma actors organize collective efforts in order to bring about political 
change. In discussing ethno-political mobilization in Romania, I include NGO work not only 
because there is considerable overlap between political efforts and non-governmental efforts, but 
also because there is a shared acceptance of a politicized Roma identity by both politicians and 
NGO workers that mutually support ethno-political mobilization. This is perhaps most evident in 
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the work of Roma NGOs that have elaborated projects that aim to create Roma representatives 
by training individuals (Klímová 2002). 
Since the early 1990s, Roma have taken advantage of these possibilities and have 
organized political parties and NGOs in Romania. With the entrance of the country into the EU 
as a New Member State in 2007, these mobilization efforts have gained new recognition and 
support in the form of EU policies, directives, commissions, and funding opportunities. 
 In the current Romania, there are many efforts in the name of Roma by NGOs, 
government offices, Gypsies, non-Gypsies, elites, and grassroots leaders. Given this plethora of 
initiatives in the name of Roma in Romania, my discussion of Roma mobilization must 
necessarily exclude certain efforts while highlighting others. I limit my discussion of Roma 
mobilization to the efforts made by Romanian Roma for Roma. While non-Roma are often 
integral to the functioning and support of Roma mobilization efforts, I did not have the time or 
the resources to address the relationship between Gypsies and Romanians within mobilization 
contexts. Instead, I focus on the way in which Roma elite frame their own efforts for Roma in 
Romania, and how those efforts, in turn, are received by Gypsies who are not involved in 
mobilization efforts. 
In discussing Roma mobilization with both elites and non-elite Roma, it is clear that the 
space of post-communist possibility is also riddled with obstacles. The process of 
deindustrialization and the rise of democracy left many Roma unemployed and ‘de-skilled,’ 
poorly educated and segregated. And while elites have successfully mobilized Romanian 
governmental support and EU backing, they apparently face apathy and serious distrust from 
local Gypsy communities. Gypsies in local communities challenge the concept that elite Roma 
represent local Gypsy interests, depending instead on local forms of leadership. 
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In their work for the Roma mobilization movement, Roma elite, who are integral to the 
Roma mobilization project, are faced with the prospect of having to navigate between interest- 
and identity-based advocacy as well as between international, national, and local actors. They are 
simultaneously accountable to the sometimes divergent interests of powerful individuals, private 
foundations, the state, and the European Union. While most in the Roma movement are steadily 
working toward the goal of Roma social and economic integration by seeking anti-discrimination 
policies and economic aid, the navigation of these different demands and the weakness of 
networks between Roma mobilizers make the movement fragmented and lowers the confidence 
Gypsies have in it. 
In my thesis, I argue that the current formulation of the Roma mobilization project suffers 
from a crisis of legitimacy that is based in the weak connections between national level efforts 
and local Gypsy communities. At the grassroots level, Gypsies challenge the idea that Roma 
leaders represent their communities. By upholding local leaders who are in constant contact with 
local communities of Gypsies and who have ‘earned’ their right to represent local Gypsy 
interests through community service, Gypsies illustrate the type of leadership they deem to be 
legitimate and challenge the representative rights of Roma on the national level.  
The Roma movement in Romania has thus far failed to appeal to Roma voters despite the 
existence of many necessary conditions for success because of the disjuncture between the 
national and the local level of the movement. This disjuncture is partially due to the centralized 
nature of the political structure in which Roma are mobilizing. When Roma leaders describe the 
benefits to Roma that would result from successful mobilization, Gypsies on the grassroots level 
do not recognize themselves as the beneficiaries. Given the local affiliation and loyalty of many 
Gypsies, the lack of connection between local representatives and the national level lead Gypsies 
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to suspect that their communities are not taken into account in forming the aid projects and that 
the Roma movement is essentially an elite one. 
The tensions between the local and the national, Gypsies and Roma, direct aid and 
indirect representation inform the overall process of Roma integration and mobilization in 
Romania, and will fundamentally shape the potential of any mobilization project– whether that 
project is one of minority representation within the nation, ethnic mobilization, or international 
human rights within the framework of the EU. Thus, questions about these processes and 
tensions within Romania formed the basis of my ethnographic fieldwork. 
Methodology 
While abroad in Hungary and Romania in the spring of 2010, the aim of my independent 
research was to gather a cross section of discourses about Roma mobilization in the context of 
the international objective of Roma integration. In order to get a wide variety of opinions on 
Roma identity and political mobilization, I resolved to conduct interviews with people both 
within and not affiliated with the mobilization movement.   
My primary research was done within the framework of a semester-long study abroad 
program located in Hungary and Romania. The first part of my semester was spent in Budapest– 
coincidentally a hub of intellectual production in the study of Roma. I spent my time there 
situating myself within the discourses of nationalism, ethnic mobilization, and Roma Studies. 
The latter allowed me to get a sense of the ways in which intellectuals viewed the Roma and 
issues of Roma integration and mobilization. During the second part of the semester, I moved to 
a small city in Transylvania, where I had access to a government funded minority research 
institute. At this institute, I had access to fieldwork advisors who helped me formulate my 
interview questions and also provided interpreters for my interviews. 
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With only two weeks in which to do interviews, I decided to focus my attention on 
interviewing Roma living in Transylvania. I did this for two reasons: first and foremost, most of 
the academic work available on Roma issues in Central and Eastern Europe came from non-
Roma scholars, and often did not include any Roma voices. I was interested in how Roma 
described their own efforts. Secondly, since my research deals heavily with identity 
mobilization, I wished to understand how Roma individuals processed and thought about their 
own identity within the movement.  
Some of my informants were government employees working for specialized Roma 
departments and others were Roma NGO workers. The rest were from a small settlement on the 
edge of an old industrial town, and were not employed in the Roma mobilization efforts. This 
particular area was chosen as the site of my interviews within this town because the settlement 
had more distinctive boundaries and a clear Roma makeup. My advisor at my host research 
institution also had the contact information of a central figure in this Roma settlement, 
facilitating contact with this community. In order to differentiate between these two sets of 
interviewees, I will refer to interviews by an anonymous marker of location. Those I interviewed 
in the urban center will be referred to as City interviewees, those from the edges of the industrial 
town will be referred to as the Settlement interviewees.  
From April 30 to May 17, 2010, I conducted interviews. Four of my informants were 
NGO and government employees of Gypsy origin who were working on Roma issues. One of 
my informants was a Roma woman active in a Roma student organization within this city, and 
another was a non-Roma sociologist working in a nearby settlement, who provided commentary 
through which to situate my findings in a larger context. All six of these interviews were 
conducted within the Transylvanian city in which I lived. For the remaining interviews, I went to 
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the Roma settlement in the industrial town and conducted interviews with two community 
leaders and seven community members. All of the interviews except one were done with the help 
of a paid interpreter, and all interviews were recorded on a digital tape recorder with the 
permission of the informants. 
Though I attempted to conduct my interviews in such a manner as to hear as many 
different voices as possible, my methodology poses certain limitations. Firstly, I mostly 
conducted the interviews through an interpreter, thereby causing concern about the translation of 
both my questions and the informants’ answers. Secondly, while I talked to many non-Roma and 
Roma alike about these issues, I only recorded interviews with fifteen people, and those were 
people who were either in contact with the research institution I was affiliated with, or who were 
willing to talk to me based on my connection to local leaders.  
In the Gypsy settlement in the industrial town, my access to interviewees was physically 
limited because the community leader refused to let me walk through the settlement 
unaccompanied, and felt it was improper to let me wander into the poorest parts of the 
settlement. Thus, the interviewees I had within the settlement were wealthier, and were aware 
that I was affiliated with the community leader who introduced me to them. Though this 
certainly limited the range of opinions that I heard, it is interesting to note that my affiliation 
with this community leader seemed to make people in the community more comfortable with 
me, since he vouched for me and helped my interpreter explain my research goals in terms that 
were more familiar to the community.  
Another factor that should not be ignored is that I am a foreigner. In some cases, 
interviewees said that my foreignness made me easier to talk to about Gypsy-Romanian 
relations. Others mentioned that the answers I would receive from poor Roma would be skewed 
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because of their attempts to gain either material resources  or sympathy from me. Either way, 
interviews were further complicated by the fact that my main interpreter was a Romanian 
woman. That fact in itself also meant that the interviews were conducted in Romanian, since my 
interpreter did not speak Romani. Therefore, I was simply unable to interview the people within 
the settlement who did not speak Romanian. 
Situating my work in the literature 
The conversations I had with Gypsies and Roma working toward ethno-political 
mobilization in Romania underscored the commentary of many authors on the unpopularity of 
the Roma movement at the grassroots level. In my thesis, I will argue that the Roma movement 
in Romania is relatively unpopular on the grassroots level not because it is a new movement or 
because Gypsies are apolitical, but because the movement is framed in such a way as to appeal to 
powerful non-Gypsy authorities rather than local Roma communities. In fact, I argue that many 
Gypsies are involved in local politics and are involved in validating local Roma leaders. These 
Gypsies choose not to vote for the Roma parties in national elections because they do not support 
these parties, which is in itself a political statement.  
In making this argument, I draw broadly from two types of literature: that which 
addresses identity politics broadly, specifically the literature on nationalism and ethnicity, and 
that of Roma Studies.  
The first body of literature dealing with nationalism and ethnicity is useful in order to 
explain the ways in which many in Eastern and Central Europe think about collective identity 
and legitimate identity-based politics. In this context, as in many other parts of the world, 
nationalism and ethnicity are used to justify certain social rights by collectivities deemed nations 
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or ethnic groups. Not surprisingly, actors within the Roma movement in Romania draw from 
these discourses.  
Roma Studies, on the other hand, deals more broadly with Roma history and identity. In 
focusing on the Roma case, Roma Studies illuminate the difficulties in situating Gypsies within 
the nation as an ethnic group through Roma ethno-political mobilization.  
Nationalism and Ethnicity 
Roma mobilizers employ ethnicity in order to stake their claim to Roma rights as 
minorities in the nation. Those attempting to mobilize Roma aim to secure and increase Roma 
representation on the national level, solidify an ethnic Roma identity as opposed to narrower 
Gypsy identities, and to mobilize popular support from Roma in Romania to address the lack of 
Roma integration and equality.  
Nationalism and ethnicity are central organizing principles in the creation and 
mobilization of social identities in order to access rights. As Calhoun writes, “nationalism has 
become the preeminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self-
determination” (Calhoun 1993:213). Similarly, ethnicity has been used to claim minority rights 
within modern nation-states.  
As Brubaker points out, there has been a shift in understanding nations and ethnic groups 
as bounded or substantial things that exist and can be defined to a more processual and dynamic 
understanding which focuses on how nations and ethnic groups are created and maintained 
through nationalism and ethnicity (Brubaker 2009). I take as a starting point these processual 
approaches, lines of inquiry heavily influenced by Frederik Barth’s view that ethnicity is not 
about the “cultural stuff” (Brubaker 2009:29) but about the maintenance of ethnic boundaries 
according to whatever us/them distinctions members of the ethnic group consider salient at any 
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given time. For Barth, the focus on boundary maintenance allows for change over time and 
interaction with other ethnic groups without the dissolution of ethnic identity. This approach to 
ethnicity is useful in that it allows us to understand how Roma activists may reference a Roma 
group that does not necessarily share any cultural content but maintains a distinction between the 
group and non-Roma– a phenomenon that is certainly visible in my work with Gypsies in 
Romania. 
Others have pointed to the long-term creation of nationhood and ethnic groups through 
processes of cultural unification and homogenization within a shared territory (Smith 1989; 
Hroch 1993; Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000). As Gellner and Hecther argue, these processes of 
cultural homogenization occur to aid the switch to direct rule in modern industrial states, 
enabling more effective dissemination of government policies and economic growth 
(Balakrishnan 1996; Hechter 2000). In the process of nation creation, language and culture often 
become linked as homogenization of both allows for better communication across the various 
sectors of modern states. As Hroch points out, a "density of linguistic or cultural ties enabl[es] a 
higher degree of social communication with the group than beyond," thus creating a sense of 
unity and making the daily transactions of society easier (Hroch 1993:5). These processes of 
linguistic and cultural homogenization occur through the assimilation of different groups into a 
dominant culture through education and literate high-culture (Hechter 2000). 
For some, the creation of nation is not guaranteed by the availability of networks of 
shared cultural and educational institutions, but require the active formation of “national 
sentiment” by “nationalist actors” (Smith 1989:342-3). For Smith, national sentiment is created 
by drawing on or creating myths of a common past that are spread “downwards through the 
strata of the population” (Smith 1989:343). This highlights the role of individual actors, often 
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elites, in creating a sense of collective identity. But Smith also highlights the importance of the 
collective sentiment and solidarity for all the people who are meant to be included in the 
collective identity that is being forged.  
Benedict Anderson also highlights the constructed nature of the nation as “an imagined 
political community”(Anderson 1991:6). For Anderson, this imagination is a central part of what 
Smith considers to be national sentiment, since Anderson points out the no nation exists in which 
all members know each other, yet in the minds of those in the nation “lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson 1991:6). For Anderson, like Barth, nations exist with boundaries, since 
no nation encompasses all of mankind; yet Anderson points out that a nation’s borders are 
permeable and “elastic” (Anderson 1991:7). Anderson’s view of nation as imagined draws 
attention to the ways in which nations are constructed without delegitimizing that process or 
implying that nations are constructed communities in a world where natural communities exist.  
I will address the position of Gypsies in Romania during the period of nation-formation 
in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in Chapter 2. For now, it is enough to 
point out that Roma, in general, were not considered to be part of the imagined communities of 
either Hungarians or Romanians in Transylvania, or the rest of Romania for that matter. They 
remained outside the nation and often, nationalist rhetoric was used to further cement their 
position as outsiders in the nation-state. 
Yet Gypsies weren’t the only people to fail to create a nation and gain autonomy and self-
determination in the era of nation-state formation. Ethnic groups are often distinguished from 
nations in that nations are attributed the right to self-determination, whereas ethnic groups have 
no such right. Calhoun argues that “ethnic groups are defined in relation to the nation-state as 
subordinate internal and/or cross-cutting identities” (Calhoun 1993:220-1). As Calhoun points 
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out, a nation is “an ethnic group that has proved its superiority in historical struggle” (Calhoun 
1993:221). Ethnic groups, however, can make claims to collective minority rights within nation 
states. Thus, while ethnicity cannot be used to lay claims to the same types of sovereignty that 
nations can, ethnicity is often successfully used to mobilize for language and political rights in 
contemporary Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere.  
Roma ethno-political mobilization follows the trend of many successful ethno-political 
mobilization projects in the region. Roma leaders in Romania cite the need for minority 
protections, language rights, economic integration, and anti-discrimination statutes in an agenda 
that directly reflects the successful demands of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Myths of a 
common Roma past are being disseminated, linguistic homogenization of Romani is encouraged 
by the Romanian state, and NGO and government bodies are working toward the 
institutionalization of Roma representation on all levels and Roma protections in all sectors of 
society.  
In many ways, the Roma movement has access to the structures that many authors point 
to as necessary for successful collective mobilization. Yet after twenty years of post-communist 
mobilization in Romania, the Roma movement is still unable to mobilize mass support from 
Gypsies across the country. With that in mind, I find it particularly useful to draw on the work of 
Rogers Brubaker who, through his introduction of the term ‘groupness,’ lays the groundwork for 
a line of inquiry of moments in which group solidarity fail to crystallize. 
According to Brubaker, groupness is the feeling of solidarity between individuals. 
Groupness is often the end-goal of what Brubaker terms "ethnopolitical entrepreneurs" (Brubaker 
2006:168). These entrepreneurs might be the agents of the state or of a movement based on 
claims to ethnicity. In grassroots identity-based movements, individuals can play with 
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categorizations imposed on them by the state in order to foster a greater sense of groupness. 
Thus, actors at all levels of society can influence groupness, but the extent of solidarity can vary 
widely from context to context. Importantly, despite the "group-making efforts" of these 
entrepreneurs, "groupness may not happen, high levels of groupness might fail to 
crystallize...even in situations of high elite-level ethnopolitical conflict" (Brubaker 2006:168). 
Brubaker’s theory is useful in that it points to the importance of a felt sense of solidarity 
and the fact that the sense of solidarity is highly variable. Individuals can draw on whatever 
points of commonality are useful to create a sense of groupness in any given context, and the 
factors that are drawn upon can change from the local level to the national level, from place to 
place, and across time. There is no one set of relations between individuals in an ethno-political 
collectivity, no clear boundary that is salient across all segments of that group at any given time.  
Brubaker’s theory is useful in that it bridges the literature on nationalism and ethnicity 
with the literature which addresses situational ethnicity, allowing for individual choices in 
identification as well as highly contextual group identity and solidarity. Ethnic identity is not just 
contextual in the sense that individuals have a “subjective perception of a [social] situation” and 
make decisions about identification in that moment (Okamura 1981:454). Relations of solidarity 
and ethno-political meaning, according to Brubaker, are by no means constant on the level of the 
so-called group. 
In sum, different members of an ethnic group can change the criteria with which to 
differentiate between those that belong to ‘their group’ and those that are outsiders and can 
choose to identify or not to identify based on ethnicity at any given time.  
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Categorization and self-identification 
Brubaker’s cognitive approach to ethnicity lays the foundation for a discussion of 
categorization and self-ascription, processes that are of central importance to the Roma political 
project and to the lack of salience of the Roma identity for many Gypsies in Romania.  
Categorization has been largely employed by modern nation-states that seek to 
"monopolize not only legitimate physical force but also legitimate symbolic force" (Brubaker 
and Cooper 2000:15). This symbolic force "include[s] the power to name... to state what is what 
and who is who" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:15). This process of inscription occurs 
simultaneously through the interaction of social subjects with various social institutions. In turn, 
the existence of categories and norms enables the reproduction of society by facilitating 
bureaucratic control and moral citizenship. 
The processes of categorization and self-identification “take place in dialectical interplay” 
and “need not converge" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:15). The classification of an individual as 
part of an ethnic group does not guarantee similar self-identification, and certainly does not lead 
to commitment to that ethnicity. Individuals might deem certain types of ethnic categorization 
deleterious in social relations, and can choose to self-identify differently. This is especially 
relevant in cases where ethnic categories are stigmatized, as in the case of Roma. 
All in all, the literature on nationalism and ethnicity illuminates much of the reasoning 
used by Roma activists and leaders in framing their mobilization project; it also highlights the 
potential barriers to group formation in regards to this population. As my thesis is a consideration 
of some of the reasons why the Roma movement in Romania has thus far failed to appeal to non-
elite Roma, my work is in line with that of Paul Brass, who also considers some reasons why 
ethnic movements might fail. In his work on the Maithili movement in Bihar, Brass points to a 
similar existence of necessary “objective conditions” for the creation of a mass consciousness 
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and subsequent mobilization, yet a failure on the part of elites to transmit this movement to the 
mass of Maithili speaking peoples. The reasons for this, though distinctly different from that of 
the Roma, are nonetheless useful in illuminating what is so often left out of the literature on 
mobilization: specific examples of failure. 
As will be elaborated below, Gypsies often have a sense of groupness with local 
communities that are based on a specific locale or a narrower Gypsy subgroup while feeling no 
solidarity to other Roma. Thus, when Roma leaders attempt to draw on Roma culture and Roma 
tradition, their claims based on ethnicity may clash with local claims to ‘subgroup’ ethnicity or 
groupness.  
While these local groups may not be entirely averse to employing a more respectable and 
socially supported ethnicity, which Roma ethnicity aims to be, the lack of connection between 
Roma leaders and local groups currently inhibit this transition. In my interviews, many Gypsies 
cite a failure by Roma leaders to appeal to their interests as the reason for the lack of their 
support– rather than an individual choice to avoid stigma or a lack of awareness of the 
mobilization movement. In the next section, I will lay the foundations for a discussion of the 
particularities of the Roma in regards to political mobilization, and potential reasons why 
groupness may fail to crystallize despite the fact that many necessary conditions are in place for 
that formation.  
Roma Studies 
In attempting to understand why Gypsies in Romania have so far been relatively 
unresponsive to Roma mobilization despite the use of various initiatives to build group 
solidarity, it is necessary to consider the current forms of Roma and Gypsy identity that Roma 
‘ethno-political entrepreneurs’ are attempting to mold. 
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Recent work on the subject of Roma are often introduced with the caveat that the Roma 
are extremely diverse; often, the authors admit that placing all the people who are classified as 
Roma under one umbrella term is more a matter of expedience than a social reality of group 
identity, since the functioning of local identities often challenge or even inverse the foundations 
of Gypsy identities in other locales (See Arias 2002; Beissinger 2001; Gay y Blasco 2000; 
Klímová 2002; Okely 1983; Rat 2005; Silverman 1988). It has been noted of Gypsies in Spain, 
for instance, that local identities are strong, and communities are relatively bounded; but these 
Gypsies are highly segmented and do not imagine themselves to be the same as Spanish Gypsies 
in other neighborhoods, let alone part of an overarching Roma people (Gay y Blasco 2002; Arias 
2002). Across Europe, researchers are finding the same to be true for many Gypsies, including 
those in Romania (Beissinger 2001; Gay y Blasco 2002; Rughinis 2010; Vermeersch 2005). 
The origins of Gypsy subgroups 
In addressing the fragmentation of Gypsies in Europe, it is useful to consider the idea of 
Gypsy subgroups– groups that can supposedly be united under the Roma ethnicity.  
Kamill Erdıs, a Hungarian scholar, provided the seminal classification of Hungarian 
Gypsy subgroups that has been echoed by many other scholars. He classified Gypsies according 
to language and vocation. Erdıs first divided those whose mother tongue was ‘the Gypsy 
language’ from those whose mother tongue was not the Gypsy language. These two groups were 
further subdivided, since Erdıs believed there to be two main Gypsy dialects– the Carpathian 
and the Romani (Vlach) dialects. Those whose mother tongue was not a Gypsy language were 
according to whether they spoke Hungarian or Romanian. Erdıs then further subdivided these 
linguistic groups according to the occupations in which they were traditionally employed (Kállai 
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2002:14) This focus on linguistic and vocational differences became central to the way in which 
many early scholars viewed Gypsy ‘subgroups.’  
Though later scholars became critical of the existence of subgroups with such clear 
boundaries, many continue to discuss the Roma in Europe in such a way as to highlight linguistic 
and occupational differences. This approach is certainly relevant for some Roma in Central and 
Eastern Europe, including some in Romania. Yet the changing economic conditions in this 
region have affected the social organization of Gypsies as much as non-Roma in this region, with 
many in Romania becoming more mobile and mixing more frequently. I believe that the 
persistence of the notion of Gypsy subgroups obscures, to some extent, the lived reality of Gypsy 
identity in present-day Romania, and can be problematic in terms of understanding Roma 
politics. 
The history of Roma labor provides a good entry point into understanding the evolution 
of Gypsy subgroups. Many authors have pointed to the origin of different Roma subgroups 
during the medieval period in Central and Eastern Europe through differentiation in labor. Some 
groups developed different sets of skills as they travelled as niche laborers in medieval Europe, 
while others were forcibly separated into different labor groups under slavery; these 
differentiations became magnified over the centuries, until groups could be distinguished by 
clearer linguistic and cultural differences (Beissinger 2001; Kemény 2005).  
In many parts of the region, Gypsies were a mobile labor force that could supplement 
stationary peasant labor. Gypsies were historically employed as skilled metal- and wood- 
workers, building weapons and defenses and producing tools for soldiers and farmers. Many 
Gypsy groups specialized in this type of production during the turbulent times of war in Central 
Europe with the Ottoman Empire around the middle of the millennium. When these wars came to 
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an end, and the Ottomans occupied Romania, Gypsies became known as kettle-makers and 
menders, spoon-makers and trough-makers as the demand shifted from weapons to farming and 
household goods (Kemény 2005:38).1  
Yet as István Kemény meticulously points out, the nature of work in Central and Eastern 
Europe changed drastically with the rise of industrialization, and labor demands began to shift. In 
the Hungarian census of 1893, which tracked the occupations of a few thousand Gypsies, it 
became apparent that many Gypsies no longer roamed about in caravans as blacksmiths, 
woodworkers, or metal-workers, but were instead settled. At this time, day-labor was by far the 
most common form of work for Gypsies. The second most common occupation for Gypsies by 
the late nineteenth century was industry; the third most common occupation, employing a 
significantly smaller percentage of Roma, was that of a being a musician, and there were a 
handful of Roma that were involved in farm work on a more permanent basis than daily work 
(Kemény 2005:33).   
One of the only traditional occupational groups that remained salient throughout the 
nineteenth century was that of the blacksmiths, since their work continued to be fundamental to 
the functioning of farms (Kemény 2005:36). Yet as Kemény notes, by the end of the 1930s in 
Hungary and Romania, the economic landscape had changed so significantly with steady 
increases in industrialization that Roma blacksmiths– practitioners of the oldest trade and one of 
the most respected– had been “completely pushed out of the economy” (Kemény 2005:45). 
They, like other Roma, were forced to adapt to new working conditions, pursuing jobs in 
industry and performing day labor. 
The distinction between Gypsies and non-Gypsies in work life shifted to that of 
remuneration and documentation of labor. While both Gypsies and non-Gypsies worked in 
                                            
1 The historical relevance of Gypsies doing niche work will be further explored in Chapter 2. 
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factories and fields, Gypsies were far more likely to be day-laborers without contracts, and also 
far more likely to be paid less for their work. I believe this foreshadows the development of a 
popular distinction between Gypsies and non-Gypsies according to poverty, participation in the 
informal economy, and unemployment. Furthermore, these changes in occupation are relevant 
because Gypsies began seeking jobs based on what was available rather than affiliation with a 
distinct Gypsy cultural group. This set the stage for more inter-mixture between Gypsies in 
Romania under communism and in the post-communist period. 
Gypsy groups in post-communist Romania 
The impact of economic and political changes– especially the rise and fall of 
communism– on the social organization of Gypsies in Romania is not well explored in the 
literature. In attempting to link my own findings with those of others, however, I find it useful to 
consider the work of Cosima Rughinis, who systematically investigates Roma identification 
through surveys in post-communist Romania. Rughinis defines Gypsy subgroups in Romania, 
neam or neamuri, as “groups based on common social institutions and a certain degree of 
consanguinity, maintained by intermarriage. Members of a particular neam often share similar 
occupations, a mother tongue, religion or social position.” These traditional occupations and 
lifestyles are transmitted “through family and endogamy” (Rughinis 2010:146-7).  
In assessing the relevance of neam affiliation in modern Romania, Rughinis notes the 
decrease in traditional occupations and continued changes within Gypsy life in Central and 
Eastern Europe, arguing that the relevance of identification with a neam affiliation is not well 
understood. In a recent large-scale survey of Romanian Gypsies, sixty percent of self-identified 
Roma respondents stated a neam affiliation; forty percent declared themselves ‘just 
Roma/Gypsy.’ However, two Romanian Gypsy groups seem to have preserved both this group 
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classification system and duties based on neam affiliation to a larger extent,2 and still prefer 
marriage within the group (Rughinis 2010:347).  
Most of the Roma I talked to insisted that such classifications did not describe their social 
lives; marriage was not limited to an ‘in-group’ of Gypsies, and people moved into communities 
with different Gypsies and non-Gypsies in order to seek employment. In this sense, many of my 
informants insisted that the organization of their social lives were very similar to Romanians, and 
that they made choices about their schooling and occupations with the same criteria as 
Romanians rather than affiliation with a Gypsy equivalent to clans. The implications of this for 
issues of integration, a major goal of Roma politicians and advocates, will be further discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
For now, it is important to stress that I did not interview any Roma who considered 
themselves to be ‘traditional’ Gypsies, nor did I work with any Roma who claimed to uphold any 
cultural or moral standards that were notably different from those of Romanians. The people I 
interviewed seemed to share the opinion that, while there might be slight linguistic and cultural 
differences between themselves and Romanians, those differences were no larger than the 
differences between Romanians and Hungarians, or even between Transylvanians and southern 
Romanians.  
Self Identification Amongst Gypsies and Roma 
The question remains, what has the crumbling of subgroup identification, the inter-
mixing of different Gypsies across Romania, and the rise of a Roma minority movement meant 
for self-identification?  
                                            
2 The Caldărari and the Lăutari (musicians) still preserve traditional occupations as well as what is often thought of 
as a more traditional Romani lifestyle. 
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Kállai Erno insists that, despite fewer visible foundations of difference between Gypsies 
and non-Gypsies, many Gypsies continue to express differences "with real and symbolic 
instruments" (Kállai 2002:25). Angus Fraser complicates this claim, addressing the highly 
variable nature of differentiation. Some individuals, Fraser writes, express a sense of solidarity 
with other Gypsies on ethnicity. Gypsies are ‘the people,’ and others are gadzo.3 Yet while many 
Gypsies accept other Gypsies to be not-gadzo, they do not necessarily see other groups as being 
the same type of Gypsy, nor do they necessarily feel any affinity for Gypsies of other 
communities (Fraser 1992:8). Though small sections of the Roma population may share  “a 
common language, a common culture” and “can be readily distinguished from their neighbors” 
(Fraser 1992), many cannot be distinguished as visible minorities and share more cultural 
symbols with local non-Gypsies than with other Gypsy groups across the country. 
All in all, it seems that while subgroup affiliation might have decreased in the sense that 
Roma have begun to intermix more frequently and no longer maintain subgroup vocations in the 
same way, Gypsy identity has not become less local or narrow. Roma who have positive 
relationships with local Romanians might identify with a more respected local definition of 
Gypsyness or, in those cases where neam affiliation is still maintained, with a more respected 
subgroup. In general, though, Gypsies are extremely discriminated against. Gypsies who seek to 
be upwardly mobile might attempt to obscure their Roma origins in order to increase their 
chances of success. Gypsies who face prejudice and do not have the ability to pass might attempt 
to navigate prejudice by distinguishing between themselves as ‘good Gypsies’ and others as ‘bad 
Gypsies’ in order to avoid discrimination.  
                                            
3 Gadzo/gadze and gadjo/gadje are some of the variations of a common way of referring to non-Gypsies. The 
concepts of Gypsy and non-Gypsy are found in Gypsy communities across Europe. 
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The impact that new local affiliations, mobile and mixed Gypsy communities, and 
differentiation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Gypsies in the face of discrimination have on the 
success of the Roma movement in Romania will be further discussed in Chapter 5, since all these 
factors contribute to the resistance of local Gypsies to national ethnic mobilization. 
Roma as an ethnic term 
Given the historical differentiation between Gypsies and the factors in self-identification 
discussed above, the rise of the term ‘Roma’ as the politically correct ethnic term for all Gypsies 
is interesting. The ethnonym ‘Roma’ is meant to reflect the “rich heritage and cultural dignity” of 
a group with a “common history and identity of interests,” rather than carrying the pejorative 
connotations of the word Gypsy (Gay y Blasco 2002:174) Yet despite occasional efforts to 
mobilize so-called Gypsies, “for over five hundred years, the Gypsy diaspora has been 
characterised by its extreme political and structural fragmentation, and by the weakness or even 
absence of any overarching Gypsy imagined community” (Gay y Blasco 2002:173).  
An important caveat is the fact that while few people who fall into the category of Roma 
or Gypsy indicate that they are part of a larger social entity of Roma, they are routinely 
discussed, represented, and oppressed as a distinct group. In Central and Eastern Europe, people 
continue to categorize others as Gypsy whether or not they self-identify as Gypsy.4 And while 
Roma Studies scholars can meticulously point out the arbitrary nature of such classifications by 
pointing to the immense diversity between those grouped together, for many of the majority 
society Gypsyness is very real and is a basis for discrimination. The social stigma and 
discrimination linked to the idea of Gypsies makes the concept of a Gypsy group a socially and 
                                            
4 Though none of the people I interviewed mentioned this, several other Roma researchers noted that those 
Romanians who were poor enough to live in the Gypsy parts of town were in danger of also being classified as 
Gypsy, which often caused significant ethnic tension in those communities. 
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culturally powerful one. Thus, social scientists and policy-makers continue to write, study, and 
make policy for Roma as if they are a coherent social collectivity.    
Organization of Chapters 
In what follows, I will present the project of Roma mobilization in Romania in order to 
explore the dynamics of identity, leadership, and legitimacy. In order to prepare for the analysis 
of my interviews, I will present a brief overview of the history of Gypsies in Central and Eastern 
Europe and expand on some of the concepts already presented in Chapter 2. Then, in Chapter 3, I 
will consider the interview material I gathered from Roma elite. In Chapter 4, I will present my 
analysis of the material I gathered from the Gypsies in the poor settlement. Finally, in Chapter 5, 
I will consider the discontinuities in how Roma elites and non-elites formulate their identities, 
their political projects, and legitimate leadership, and further expand my argument that the Roma 
movement lacks grassroots support. 
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Chapter 2: Brief History of Roma in Europe 
 
Introduction 
In what follows, I will situate my ethnographic data geographically, historically, and 
socially. As a student entering the field in Romania, I encountered a lively field of work with 
regard to the Roma Problem, making it clear that my fieldwork was not happening in a vacuum. 
While Roma studies is relatively little known in the U.S., I realized quickly that in the European 
context, the sociological if not anthropological study of Roma was routine and widely supported. 
In order to understand why this is the case– why the “Roma Problem” is so widely studied and 
talked about both academically and in civic life– it is necessary to understand the history of the 
Roma in Europe as well as the place that the Roma have in the Romanian imaginary. 
In contextualizing my fieldwork, I hope to point to the importance of attempting to 
understand Roma political life in anthropological terms, since much of what is claimed and 
represented as natural and essential in the political struggles around Roma issues is, in fact, 
contingent and contested at the grassroots level. In what follows, I will first address how the 
Roma came to be a relatively unintegrated minority population in Europe. Secondly, I will 
address the history of Roma in Romania, paying special attention to the specificities of 
Transylvania, the region in which I did my fieldwork.  
Situating the Gypsies in European History 
Sources discussing the Gypsy presence in Europe date back to the 1300s. Linguistic 
analysis and a survey of historical sources mentioning Gypsies suggests that migration into 
Europe happened in waves, and not all people considered Gypsies followed the same path of 
migration. Indeed, it has been argued that the belief that Gypsies were beggars, thieves and 
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vagrants allowed for the classification of local vagrants as Gypsies, and that some individuals or 
even whole groups considered Gypsies might have no common origin with other Gypsies. This 
theory is particularly applicable to groups such as the English Travellers (Okely 1983). For most 
Central and Eastern European Gypsies, however, origins outside Europe seem more likely, and 
can be more easily traced. There is substantial evidence to suggest that at least part of the modern 
European population of Gypsies migrated from India. 
By the 1400s, discussions of Gypsies were relatively widespread. The first accounts of 
Gypsies in the Balkan countries occurred in the mid 14th century; accounts of Gypsies in 
Transylvania arose around 1400 (Kemény 2005:1). Gypsies were noted in Western Europe a 
couple of decades later. The reception of Gypsies by local societies depended heavily on the 
socio-political that the Gypsies entered, though in general Gypsies were seen as outsiders and 
were viewed with distrust. For instance, in feudal times, the mobility of Gypsies irked some 
nobles, who wished to settle them alongside the peasantry in order to tax them and use their 
labor.  
This was especially true in western parts of Europe, where Gypsy persecution began 
shortly after their arrival. Gypsies were declared spies in the Holy Roman Empire and were 
expelled as early as 1479, though more sources point to the expulsion orders of the 1490s. At the 
completion of the Reconquista in 1492, the Spanish monarchs issued an order of expulsion of the 
Gypsies from Spain. Similar policies were found in surrounding countries (Kemény 2005:3). In 
England in 1554, the death penalty was instituted for all Gypsies who did not leave the country; 
it remained in place until 1783 (Okely 1983:4). These policies of exclusion, however, could 
generally not be fully enforced. 
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During the same time period in the region that would become southern Romania and 
Moldova, Gypsies were enslaved. The first official records of Roma slavery dates to 1385. 
Gypsy slaves were owned by boyars,5 monasteries, princes, and even the state. Gypsy slaves 
were “subject to sale, transfer, and abuse by their owners” (Beissinger 2001:28). Sometimes 
Roma slaves worked as coveted court musicians or blacksmiths. Mostly, they worked as 
“itinerant” laborers, or field and domestic slaves (Beissinger 2001:29). Roma slavery lasted for 
five hundred years. 
On the other hand, Transylvanian princes were known for issuing passes to Gypsies for 
freedom of movement and security against other nobles in foreign lands. The fact that they were 
a mobile working force was especially favored in this region at the time because the Kingdom of 
Hungary and its Transylvanian principality were facing the threat of Ottoman expansion. Princes 
were constantly engaged in defending their borders, pushing back Turkish advances, and 
defending Christian Europe. In this context, the mobility of skilled Gypsy blacksmiths and 
carpenters who traveled from village to village, repaired farms and manufactured weapons, was 
considered militarily useful. This prevented Gypsies from being categorically persecuted as 
outcasts  (Kemény 2005:6). Feudal lords sometimes directly employed the Gypsies and provided 
them with a measure of protection. However, documentation from this time suggests that while 
Gypsies were relatively free to move in a way that set them apart from most peasants, payments 
for their services were very low and the majority of Gypsies were impoverished (Kemény 
2005:12).  
Interestingly, the first documents describing Gypsy leadership stem from this time period. 
It seems that Roma began to institutionalize positions of chief or elder in order to “facilitate 
                                            
5 In the Wallachian and Moldovan region, boyars were princes who were originally elected but became hereditary 
rulers. 
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external representation in dealing with non-Roma authorities” (Klímová 2002:106). That is to 
say, the so-called ‘traditional’ leaders of Gypsy subgroups seemed to have come into existence 
primarily in order to interact with non-Gypsies and to serve as representatives in relation to 
princes and regional authorities. These leaders did not have any authority in relation to laws or 
policies, but had authority in negotiating with majority leaders. Later, these leaders continued to 
have considerable internal authority, such that one Roma leader I talked to made a point to 
mention that he was the son of such a traditional leader. 
Once the Kingdom of Hungary fell to the Turks in the battle at Mohacs in 1526, Ottoman 
decrees were issued stating that Gypsies as a “race” were not to be “harassed” in the Ottoman 
Empire, which set the Turkish treatment of Gypsies apart from most other major empires and 
kingdoms in Europe (European Commission 2004:7). However, with the fall of Hungary to the 
Otttomans, anti-Gypsy sentiments and policies arose in Habsburg territory, where Roma were 
seen as “a fifth column of the Ottoman Empire” (Vermeersch 2006:47). When the Habsburgs 
regained the region at the very end of the seventeenth century, Gypsies were subject to 
persecution as traitors. 
Once Habsburg control was thoroughly re-established in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, the first efforts were made to assimilate Roma. Maria Theresa issued a number of 
decrees between 1753 and 1772 in order to encourage the transformation of Roma from a 
separate population into “new peasants” (Kemény 2005:17).  The decrees demanded permanent 
settlement of the Gypsies, and begging (the assumed occupation of Gypsies who were not 
working the land) was outlawed. A dress code was instated to ensure that Roma would dress like 
the majority population. The decree of 1772 prohibited the use of Romani, and also prohibited 
marriages of Roma to each other. Finally, it was decided Gypsy children should be removed 
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from their homes at the age of four and placed with peasants. These decrees were widely 
ignored, and were not enforced in Hungary or what is now Romania (Kemény 2005:17).  
 
Gypsies during the rise of nation-states  
During Ottoman control of Transylvania, the principality had more independence than 
other Turkish regions. The daily rule of the vassal state fell primarily to Transylvanians, who 
developed a unique social hierarchy. Most medieval European states only had one one natio– a 
Latin term indicating a group that was comprised of all those with political rights and privileges. 
In Transylvania, on the other hand, there were three nationes: the nobles (most closely linked to 
the nobles of Hungary proper and often speaking Hungarian), the Saxons,6 and the Szeklers7 
(Brubaker 2006:57). All three groups had special legal privileges that set them apart from the 
peasants and serfs, though they were also differentiated by legal status from each other.  
Those with noble status were primarily but not always of Magyar8 descent, though by the 
time that the nationes were inscribed into Transylvanian law, the Szeklers were linguistically 
indistinguishable from the nobles– if they were ever distinct. The Saxons lived in towns as 
traders and city dwellers; despite the nomenclature, the Saxons were not from the same region. 
They were in fact drawn from regions across Germany and the Low Countries and were not 
necessarily culturally homogeneous, though their legal status in Transylvania forged them into a 
distinct group (Brubaker 2006:59). Romanian speakers, though a significant popoulation in 
Transylvania since its earliest history, had no such group rights. Most of them were peasants or 
serfs and had very limited rights or freedoms, though a few of them managed to gain noble status 
                                            
6 Germanic Transylvanians who settled steadily in the region after an invitation for settlement from the Hungarian 
rulers. 
7 Szeklers were free peasants without a hierarchy who were forced into military service to protect the borders of 
Transylvania, but who also had a number of liberties that put them alongside the nobles and Saxons as a legally 
recognized group with rights. 
8 Hungarian 
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(Brubaker 2006:58). Gypsies, who were neither part of these nationes nor part of the peasantry, 
did not fit easily into the civic organization.  
By the mid eighteenth century, a group of Romanian intelligentsia formed, and “graft[ed] 
emerging modern ethnocultural understandings of nationhood” (Brubaker 2006:60) onto the 
older institutions of nationes in this region. This ethno-political awareness was meant to provide 
the grounds upon which Romanians could access more rights within Transylvania. In the 
meantime, Hungarians were rallying around the concept of a Hungarian nation, and demanded 
that Transylvania be incorporated formally in Hungary. This happened in 1848, and sparked 
revolutionary uprisings by the Romanians within Transylvania that resulted in a type of “war 
within a war” (Brubaker 2006:61-3).  Hungarians and Romanians were struggling 
simultaneously to establish nation-states, with both sets of people claiming Transylvania as their 
heartland.  
Vienna defeated the revolution, and separated and directly governed both regions 
(Brubaker 2006:61-3). This struggle marked the beginning of Transylvania as a region situated 
“on the margins of two nations, yet imagined as central to each” (Brubaker 2006:56). In 1867, 
Hungary effectively gained its liberty despite a formal connection to the Habsburg Empire. From 
this time onwards, Transylvania passed back and forth between Romania and Hungary four 
times: the region belonged to Hungary between 1867 ad 1918, Romania between 1919 and 1940, 
split between Hungary and Romania between 1940 and 1944, and was given to Romania 
following WWII. After each one of these changes, nationalizing policies were enacted or 
renewed in an attempt to make Transylvania an “integral part of the putatively unitary and 
indivisible Hungarian or Romanian nation-state” (Brubaker 2006:63).  
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At no point in the rise of nationalism in this region were Gypsies imagined as part of any 
nation that was laying claim to Romania.  
World War II and the Rise of Communist Romania 
The fight between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania came to a fore during World 
War II. Initially, both countries were aligned with the Axis powers, and Transylvania– as a 
contested region– was split between Hungary and Romania for the purposes of cooperation. Yet 
as the tide turned and Russian troops entered Romania, Romania switched to the Allies for the 
remainder of the war. The fact that Romania was on both sides of the war had a significant 
impact on the Gypsies for two reasons: firstly, the Transylvanian and Romanian Gypsies were 
subjected to the Holocaust; secondly, the presence of Soviet troops in Romania resulted in the 
installation of the communist regime in that country which had a significant impact on the later 
formation of ‘the Gypsy Problem.’ 
Romania entered WWII in June of 1941, joining the Axis powers in the invasion of the 
Soviet Union. Within the first month of joining the war, Romania was engaging fully massacres 
of the Holocaust. While the Jewish Holocaust is generally better known, the Porrajmos9 is often 
overlooked. Yet estimates indicate that at least 10 percent of Romanian Gypsies were killed on 
trains and concentration camps in Transnistria, the region between the Dnestr and Bug Rivers 
that was under Romanian control between 1941 and 1944. Perhaps the only reasons why more 
Roma were not expelled is that accurate demographic information for Gypsies– because of their 
diversity and a lack of agreed-upon ethnic boundaries– are notoriously hard to find on official 
records. For the most part, those Roma who were more easily targeted during the Holocaust were 
the ones that were still nomadic, and thus easier to mark as Gypsy (Beissinger 2001). 
                                            
9 A Romani term for the Roma Holocaust coined by Ian Hancock, a renowned Roma Studies scholar. 
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With the Soviet threat advancing from the east, however, Romania joined the allies, and 
supported them through the rest of the war, letting Soviet troops enter and move through the 
country. At the end of the war, the Romanians anticipated Transylvania to be passed to them as 
part of the Allies rather than to the Axis affiliated Hungary. Yet the Soviets occupied it, with 
their seat in Cluj-Napoca, until such a time that the Romanians appointed a communist-
dominated administration. The Soviets allowed Romanian administration to resume in 
Transylvania once communist rule of Romania began (Brubaker 2006:105-7). Transylvania was 
officially recognized as an integral part of Romania in the 1947 Treaty of Paris. 
Romania During Communism 
Ideally, communism was supposed to eliminate national sentiment, creating a universal 
class of proletarians. Yet in practice, communist regimes recognized that different communities 
had different needs, and instituted policies aimed at specific nationalities. These policies were 
meant to equalize everyone in the population, such that national approaches would become 
obsolete. In that vein, communist Romania began by recognizing Hungarians as a national 
minority, and retaining Hungarian language education and as well as bilingual Hungarian signs 
(Brubaker 2006:117).  But Roma were not granted the status of national minority in Romania; 
they were considered to be a “group distinguishable merely in terms of its problematic social and 
economic position” (Vermeersch 2006). This attitude reflected the longstanding conflation of 
Gypsies with poverty, illiteracy, and antisocial behavior. It also reflected the fact that Gypsies 
were not included in the historical construction of the concept of community, nationhood.  
So while Romania became increasingly nationalistic in the late 1950s under the 
leadership of Ceauescu, some measure of legal protection remained for Hungarians, Germans, 
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Serbians and Ukranians but not for Gypsies.10 Because Roma were seen primarily as a social 
problem and not a nation, Romani language, cultural expression and music were prohibited in 
public (Beissinger 2001:31). And since communist ideology dictated that the state should “take 
care of those groups who, as a result of ‘capitalist exploitation’ in the past, were found to live in 
‘social and cultural backwardness’” (Csepeli and Simon 2004:130) – which Gypsies were 
considered to be– several policies were written explicitly in order to ‘improve’ the Roma. 
Schooling was considered an integral way in which to properly socialize citizens into 
communism, and also necessary to allow Gypsies to integrate successfully into a society with a 
considerably higher amount of formal education. The Romanian government also worked to 
radically decrease Gypsy unemployment, since all members of society were to be productive. 
Assimilation was the end goal, so these policies were to be enacted in such a way as to avoid 
letting Gypsies “define their identity in ethnic terms” (Vermeersch 2006). Instead, this approach 
reinforced a purely socioeconomic definition of Gypsy identity. 
Like many other socialist policies, the communist policies toward Gypsies in Romania 
were not universally applied and enforced. The desire to assimilate Gypsies was pervasive in 
discourse, but in practice, the feeling of difference between Gypsies and non-Gypsies remained. 
What is significant, however, is that most Gypsies had access to regular, documented work under 
communism. Gypsies were employed in the factories alongside Romanians and Hungarians, and 
while they may have been less likely to be advanced to higher positions than their non-Gypsy co-
workers, they had a steady income.  
As Ceauescu’s regime became increasingly distanced from the rest of the communist 
bloc, everyday life became a struggle. In the 1980s, as people spent hours waiting in line for 
                                            
10 Most of these legal protections did not have much impact on daily life, yet the establishment of workers’ councils 
and education programs geared toward these communities nonetheless allowed for the maintenance of these non-
Romanian identities. 
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basic resources, and the people of Transylvania struggled to continue life as normal with highly 
erratic supplies of heat and electricity, some suggest that “ethnicity came to seem less 
important.” There was a feeling of common oppression and hopelessness, universal exploitation 
and struggle that created a sense of commonality if not complete equality (Brubaker 2006:117). 
Whether or not that was the experience of Gypsies in this county is difficult to argue either way, 
since there are no contemporary sources to refer to; however, the ability of Gypsies to earn 
regular wages during this time alongside many Romanians who were also earning just enough to 
survive may have “blurred the boundary between Gypsies and non-Gypsies" to some extent 
(Ladányi and Szelényi 2006:137).  
The Fall of Romanian Communism and Post-Communist (Re)Construction of 
Gypsy Poverty 
 In 1989, the Berlin Wall came down and Romanians became aware of the potential for 
political change (Brubaker 2006:119). By December 20, Romanians began to rally en masse 
across the country, and shortly afterwards the Ceauescu regime fell (Brubaker 2006:121). By 
December 23, 1989, Hungarians began organizing ethno-political mobilization in the city, and 
the moment of solidarity was over (Brubaker 2006:121). Shortly after this, Roma began making 
ethno-political claims as well.  
Yet these political claims came at a time of significant transitions in the way in which the 
majority society viewed Gypsies. After communism fell in Romania, Gypsies were characterized 
once again as impoverished. Their existence as a ‘social problem’ in democratic Romania was 
reaffirmed. Yet in a transitioning capitalist democracy, the Roma were not considered the victims 
of ‘capitalist exploitation’; they became opportunistic exploiters of welfare. It is not immediately 
apparent why the switch from communism to capitalism in Romania would leave Gypsies in 
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poverty and allow Romanians and Hungarians to adapt and thrive. The answer seems to lie in a 
combination of factors including work, location, and discrimination. 
In communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe, poverty was "mainly a 
demographic phenomenon" (Ladányi and Szelényi 2006:155).  This trend seems to have held 
true for Roma as well as the majority population. Gypsies who had single mothers and multiple 
siblings, for instance, were very likely to live in poverty during communism. The presence of 
other adults capable of bringing in a monthly income or having less siblings significantly 
reduced the probability that Roma lived in poverty during socialism. The education levels of 
parents had only a marginal influence on poverty, since communism provided employment 
opportunities for virtually everyone (Ladányi and Szelényi 2006). 
Yet the nature of poverty in this area of Europe would change drastically during the 
transition to market economies. After the transition, "low levels of education combined with poor 
labor market conditions were major predictors of declining living standards." Interestingly, in the 
relatively large samples taken by Ladányi and Szelényi for their study of Roma exclusion, one-
third of Roma respondents in Hungary reported becoming poor only after 1988 (Ladányi and 
Szelényi 2006:160). Widespread accounts of Roma poverty in Romania suggest a similar pattern. 
After the transition, the decline of heavy industry– the main sector of employment for Gypsies 
during communism– created high levels of unemployment among the Roma, and a return to 
traditional styles of employment became impossible since these ‘traditional’ skills had been 
abandoned during communism (Ladányi and Szelényi 2006).  
These patterns were also very visible in neighboring Romania, where the overall 
deterioration in living standards of could also be contributed mainly to the "lower than average 
education levels of Roma" compared to Hungarians and Romanians, and the loss of unskilled 
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labor jobs (Ladányi and Szelényi 2006:162). Before 1986, eight years of formal schooling made 
it easier to find work; by 1993, “a primary or basic vocational education was no longer 
sufficient” (Kemény 2005:64). So when factories closed, Roma tended not to be amongst the 
factory laborers who could transition easily to other types of employment. Gypsies also 
experienced a sharper decline in living standards compared to Romanians because a larger 
percentage of the Roma were concentrated in rural areas where the rates of unemployment were 
significantly higher than in urban areas. Discrmination must have taken place in the process of 
transitioning employees to new job sectors as well, since controlling for other factors still leaves 
some unemployment unexplained (Kemény 2005:65). 
Through the process of transition, Gypsies once again became a population characterized 
by poverty and marginalization. The social situation of Gypsies throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe became known as the ‘Roma Problem.’ In Chapter 3, I will trace the rise of the Roma 
problem and the rise of Roma mobilization through the lenses of elite Roma who work as Roma 
representatives and leaders on the regional level in Transylvania.  
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Chapter 3: Regional Roma Elite 
 
Introduction 
Historically, Roma leaders have been representatives who were appointed by non-Roma 
or were appointed by Gypsies in order to communicate with non-Roma. In general: 
Romani representatives have been handpicked by officials of the majority government 
and have received no popular mandate from the Roma. The modalities of such 
selections have of course differed over time…During the Communist period, loyalty to 
the Party was one of the main selection criteria. Since 1989, representatives for various 
advisory bodies are selected on the basis of personal skills and perceived ability to co-
operate constructively with the government. [Klímová 2002:130] 
In Romania, as of 2000, most Roma officials are nominated by the Roma Party. The Roma Party 
received the most votes in national elections since the end of communism, and thus represents 
the party with the most Roma support. However, Klímová insists, even this party is relatively 
unsuccessful in elections, since a very small percentage of the estimated population of Roma 
seem to be voting for it (2002:130). 
In my interviews with Gypsies in Transylvania, significant distrust regarding national 
leaders surfaced. People often doubted the motives of Roma elites in pursuing Roma 
mobilization, and insinuated that Roma politics is a sector in which a number of people are 
making their fortunes. However, in my research in Transylvania, I never encountered Roma 
officials who operate on the national level of NGOs or government positions. Instead, the Roma 
whom I consider to be elites are in fact regional elites, who are quite distinct from national 
leaders. 
I define the Roma elite as Roma “with college or university degrees and all those with top 
and mid-level decision-making and management posts in government, administrative, economic, 
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educational, political, and mass organizations and units” as well as those with ascribed elite 
status based on traditional Roma leadership designated to represent Roma interests to outsiders 
(Fuller 2000:586).11 I do not mean to make an argument that the people defined as elites function 
as a coherent, politically active group, nor do I mean to indicate that the people I categorize as 
elites identify themselves as such. Rather, by naming them Roma elites, I mean to point to the 
possession of various types of social capital that are not generally found in the Gypsy population 
of Romania. Often, elites have increased access to political and civic spaces and, increasingly, 
lay claim to a politicized ethnic identity encapsulated by the term Roma.  
In this chapter, I will analyze interviews I conducted with regional Roma leaders in an 
urban center in Transylvania. I will explore the role of these elites as mediators between the 
national mobilization movement and the local implementation of projects. The people I 
interviewed spend much of their time getting to know local communities and their needs, and 
trying to implement policies effectively and creatively to meet those needs. By analyzing 
personal narratives of this work alongside considerations of meso- and macro-level political 
structures, I hope to illustrate two points: first, while regional elites come from different 
backgrounds than the most marginal Gypsies in Romania, they are intensely aware of anti-Roma 
discrimination and marginalization and work to address those issues across Romania. Their 
commitment to a Roma identity comes from a conviction to include all Gypsies in Romanian 
society, rather than to silence and ignore the experiences of Gypsies on the fringes of society. 
Secondly, Roma advocates work as mediators between the national and the local. As mediators 
between these different levels of society, they face the paradoxical realization that the diversity 
                                            
11 As mentioned in Chapter 2, Roma leaders were appointed to interact with non-Gypsy nobility. These leaders 
eventually became conventional, and gained status with Roma. There is not much written about these leaders in the 
Romanian context, however. My only knowledge of traditional leaders comes from those leaders with both 
traditional status and achieved status. 
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of the Roma population necessitates locally generated responses while the prevalence of anti-
Roma sentiment in Romania requires large-scale funding and cooperation between all major 
actors working toward Roma integration. 
In their work as mediators and facilitators, regional Roma advocates insist that national 
policies can be enacted in local communities to ensure the end of discrimination. In that sense, 
they are more optimistic than many Romanian Gypsies, who simply feel that in the process of 
passing the plans and the money for these projects through the hands of the specialists and the 
politicians who have no special connection to the local communities that they are meant for, the 
projects are corrupted and weakened, and the money often disappears before it reaches its 
destination. Yet as advocates and leaders in the region point out, the ineffectiveness of 
decentralization in Romania and the lack of collaboration between different actors in Romania 
may in fact account for the waste of funds and lack of results seen on the local level. 
In order to tease out the role that the fragmentation of Roma advocacy and the lack of 
decentralization might have in harming Roma efforts on the grassroots level and thereby 
undermining the legitimacy of national Roma projects, I will consider the work of Roma leaders 
in Transylvania. In doing so, the tension between the hopes that these leaders have for Gypsy 
communities and the acknowledgement of limitations in Roma mobilization lays the groundwork 
for the discussion of some barriers to the success of Roma ethno-political mobilization in 
Romania. The discussion of some problems in aid and advocacy work done by elites in the name 
of marginal Gypsies also lays the foundation for my discussion of how marginal Gypsies in the 
Settlement rework the vocabulary of victimization to make their own political claims.  
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Who are the regional Roma elite? 
The people whom I classify as Roma elite all– with the exception of one– identified 
themselves actively as Roma or responded that they were Roma when I asked about their ethnic 
identification. The one man who did not identify as Roma came from a mixed Roma and 
Romanian family. He identified as a Romanian citizen with Roma origins and, as part of his 
ethnic background, he felt that he had “an inclination toward the Roma minority” (Interview 
2.2).12  
All of the people whom I interviewed were advocates for the Roma.13 While the forms of 
advocacy of these interviewees varied widely, each of these Roma possessed or were pursuing at 
least one university degree or upper level professional qualification. Degrees in social work, 
administration, and teaching were common for my interviewees because these were seen as 
particularly fitting for the pursuit of government or NGO positions. These degrees also 
correspond with the first departments at the universities that had “special entrance quotas” for 
Roma students, since the Romanian government wanted to encourage the training of Roma 
origin teachers, social workers, and officials (Horvath and Scacco 2001:269). 
For almost all of my interviewees, the possession of tertiary education seemed to be the 
primary means through which they were able to pursue their careers, though family support was 
another significant factor. One interviewee stands out in this sense because she belonged to an 
elite musician family with the means to establish their own Roma NGO, and she became part of 
                                            
12 Despite the fact that this public figure does not identify as Roma and that he comes from a mixed family, people 
who knew him referred to him as Roma. One man even went as far as saying that even if he doesn’t identify as such, 
it is widely known that he ‘is really Roma.’ 
13 One interviewee is involved in a Roma student organization at the local university, another is a sociological 
researcher for Roma in a minority research institute, another is a co-founder of a national Roma NGO, another is a 
Roma councilor in a local government, and yet another is an government employee in the headquarters of a regional 
office for Roma integration. Finally, one interviewee is trained as a Romani language teacher, though she works 
with a regional Roma NGO doing social work in addition to her teaching job. 
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that work despite the fact that her training was in the medical field and not in social work 
(Interview 8:1). 
The work of regional Roma advocates 
One of the most enduring critiques of post-communist politics is corruption, and Roma 
politics in Romania is not exempt from this criticism. In my interviews with Gypsies, national 
Roma leaders were often painted as pursuing individual goals rather than representing collective 
needs. In contrast, Roma advocates in Transylvania working in regional efforts pursued work 
that consisted almost entirely of finding ways to implement the projects that others have 
proposed. In that sense, these Roma leaders are very actively involved in implementing projects 
that speak to communities or groups of Roma rather than individuals.  
Through the discussion of how my interviewees became a part of the Roma mobilization 
movement and what type of work they do, it becomes clear that despite the fact that many of 
these Roma leaders come from backgrounds dissimilar to those of the marginal Gypsies they are 
representing, their work as facilitators and mediators force these leaders to be constantly 
accountable to the demands of local communities of all types. 
The rise of Roma to regional leadership positions 
The vast majority of regional advocates and leaders came from families that were 
relatively financially stable– if not middle-class– and that lived in mixed ethnic communities 
rather than segregated Roma settlements. Most of these interviewees did face obstacles in 
pursuing their goals because of their Roma origins, however, and these obstacles enabled them to 
develop a more politicized ethnicity later in their careers.  
One woman stands out amongst my interviewees for her access to significant economic 
and political resources in the process of building her career. She belongs to a musician family, 
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and as such came from a type of traditional Roma elite. Her father was one of nine children, each 
of whom became the head of an orchestra. Growing up, her family had the means and inclination 
to help her in her education, and supported her in her studies to become a nurse and in the 
establishment of her first home (Interview 8:1-2).  
One side of another interviewee’s family worked as less prestigious musicians, while the 
other side of her family were cobblers, and were richer relative to her neighbors than the 
musician side. This woman’s parents struggled over conflicting values, with her mother valuing 
formal education and its potential for upward social mobility more than the rest of her family. 
Thus, while my interviewee was still young, her parents moved onto a street with many other 
Romanian and Hungarian families in another city in order to pursue a better formal education for 
their children than was available to them in their former Roma community.  
In her earliest schooling, this woman had a number of Roma classmates; yet by the time 
she reached high school she was the only Roma student. When she graduated high school, she 
decided not to pursue a university degree because the standards for entrance were extremely high 
and she did not have access to tutors. She also could also not afford to pursue a degree without a 
scholarship. In the absence of further schooling, she was assigned a factory job by the 
communist government.  
When the communist regime came to an end, the loss of her factory job resulted in some 
downward socio-economic mobility. In order to access better jobs, she took a sewing class and 
worked as a seamstress. In 2003, she began working for a Roma NGO, through which the 
principal of a school approached her and offered her a position as a Romani language teacher. 
The terms of this position required her to undergo schooling that would be paid for by a pre-
accession instrument of the EU called Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their 
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Economies (PHARE).14 She agreed readily, and enrolled in a certification process through which 
she did most of her degree by mail. Through cooperation with the PHARE project and the 
availability of getting a degree through the mail, she was able to overcome three primary barriers 
to her higher education: cost of tuition, cost of travel to a university away from her family, and 
the familial expectation that her husband would accompany her to her classes, thus making an 
education in another city impossible.  
Another interviewee grew up in a high rise in a mixed area, with many Hungarian 
families; he never felt that they were materially different from these other families. As he put it, 
he never felt “inferior” to his Hungarian and Romanian classmates in any way, and was always 
able to pay for the same types of things they were able to pay for, including class excursions and 
clothing (Interview 1:4). Upon completion of the eighth grade, he had difficulty deciding 
whether to pursue a general education high school or go to professional school.15 His mother 
valued education and felt he would do well to pursue a high school degree through a theological 
school in his town. Yet his father felt that a professional degree would be more practical option 
since it would more likely lead to an occupation. He decided to pursue a professional degree in 
auto-mechanics because he could not “properly evaluate [his] potential” (Interview 1:2) at that 
age, and was afraid that he would not be able to pass the entrance exams for general schooling.  
A month after finishing the professional school, however, he decided to pursue a high 
school degree through night classes. Luckily, his friends and family used their contacts to get 
him a job while pursuing night classes, since as the eldest of five children, he felt some 
obligation to contribute to the family income. He passed his baccalaureate exam in 2002, and 
                                            
14 The PHARE program has expanded its scope as the European Union considered and then accepted New Member 
States in 2004 and 2007. 
15 In Romania, professional degrees approximate high school technical training, and general education high school 
are like American high school in the sense that they cover broader topics and are less technically and vocationally 
focused. A general education is needed to pursue university training. 
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decided to apply to get a degree in sociology. The decision to pursue a sociology degree was 
based on the fact that he knew two Roma students– one of them a family member– who were 
pursuing their sociology degrees; they also told him that the sociology department designated 
spots for Roma students through affirmative action policies (Interview 1:1). A year later, when 
the theology department opened up spots for Roma students through a similar policy, my 
interviewee successfully managed to pursue a second degree there despite a previous failed 
attempt (Interview 1:10).16 
After graduating from the sociology faculty, he got a job as a Roma school counselor 
through a project funded by a private foundation. Several Roma school counselors were placed 
in schools to guide Roma students through their education and advise them on their futures 
(Interview 1:4-5). My interviewee worked as a school counselor for a year. However, at the end 
of the year, the program failed to be adopted by the local county and funding ran out. This was 
generally believed by the Roma employees to be a result of a lack of local interest in continuing 
the program rather than a lack of local funds (Interview 1:9) When the program ended, my 
interviewee got a job working as a sociological researcher for a state-funded institution studying 
minority groups in Romania, which was the context in which I met him.  
As these stories illustrate, Roma elite come from diverse backgrounds. Yet there are 
some commonalities: namely, increased access to education, support of family members in the 
pursuit of degrees, and interestingly, being part of an ethnically mixed community. Not one of 
my elite interviewees lived in a Roma settlement through their educational years, which perhaps 
speaks of the limited opportunities available in these settlement schools. 
 
                                            
16
 He had previously attempted to pursue a theology degree but had failed the examinations, and waited until the 
affirmative action policy was applied in this field. 
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Experiences of discrimination and identification 
 Despite the fact that these interviewees grew up in conditions that were not particularly 
marginal, all of my interviewees who discussed their childhood also mentioned discrimination 
toward Roma as part of their history. These experiences were incorporated into the narratives of 
how these elites became committed to working for the Roma rather than attempting to assimilate 
into the Romanian community– an option that many of them hinted was available to them given 
their university degrees.  
While access to mixed schooling was a common theme and enabled these elites to have 
access to better schooling than many who attend segregated schools, one of my interviewees 
highlighted that non-Gypsy teachers and students often reacted differently to Roma students. 
When he was in first grade, for instance, this man had a Romungro (a Hungarian-speaking 
Roma) classmate. Though in general teachers placed children in a seating chart according to 
height, his teacher put him and this other Roma classmate at the back of the classroom at the 
same bench, which placed him much further back than his height warranted. When the 
Romungro girl dropped out of school, this man remained alone at the back of the classroom for 
four years.  
Thus, while my interviewee was able to compete with those Hungarian and Romanian 
families financially while growing up, the fact that be was labeled Roma– based on his last 
name, which was considered to be a Roma one, and his darker skin tone– resulted in 
experiences of discrimination (Interview 1:4). Only after he graduated and worked as a school 
counselor in a locality where about half of the children were Roma did he start to recognize 
this and other experiences from his past as discrimination based on his ethnicity, and began 
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wondering how those subtle forms of marginalization affected his sense of self-worth as a 
student (Interview 1:3). 
 The sentiment was echoed by another interviewee who did not grow up in poverty, and 
lived in a mixed neighborhood with Romanians and Hungarians.  
I always had this feeling that I was the only Roma person in the community, and I 
would always feel the discrimination even if I am not really dark skinned and not dirty 
or anything … I could feel when they were speaking about Roma people… I was 
touched by it.  [Interview 3.1] 
Clearly, even those Roma who were able to compete with Romanians in school and did not 
have markers of poverty were still affected by the lack of positive associations with Roma in 
whichever settings they entered. 
 In some cases, my interviewees described the combination of personal experiences of 
discrimination with new understandings of structural marginalization into the basis for a 
politicized Roma identity. One interviewee took a seminar on Roma issues, which allowed 
him to connect his personal experiences with those of others, forming the basis for his 
eventual acceptance of the identity ‘Roma.’ Yet despite the growing confidence in his Roma 
identity and the ideological support of the sociological material– which highlighted the 
problematic nature of anti-Roma sentiment– my interviewee still did not feel comfortable 
identifying himself in his department as Roma: 
It was difficult because among the two hundred and forty students in the sociology 
faculty, I was the only Roma student. And of course, once I learned about these things, 
I didn't say to my colleagues, "Hey, hey I'm a Roma." This process was a more gradual 
one. I was also lucky because I had the support of my parents, the support of my 
background, and through this I had good support in understanding, working, and 
developing the abilities to understand the situation of the Roma generally. 
[Interview1:6] 
He felt that Roma students who came to the university faced real challenges in revealing their 
identity precisely because negative stereotypes of Gypsies abounded.  
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Overall, this man felt that he was better situated to understand the political incentive to 
identify as Roma than many other Gypsies, and was also better situated within support networks 
to take a political stance on issues of discrimination. He told me that until the understanding of 
what it means to be Roma changes, he does not believe that it would be possible for most Roma 
students to claim Roma ethnicity (Interview 1:7).  
Reasons for entering Roma advocacy 
The elites I interviewed viewed their work as necessary forms of representation and 
activism that need to be done in order for Roma integration to occur. They were critical of others 
whom they believed to be part of the Roma movement in order to profit– a critique of the 
national movement that is often heard at the grassroots level. To make the distinction between 
themselves as legitimate Roma workers and those who were in it for convenience and profit, 
these elites highlighted the fact that their work entailed significant amounts of thankless work. 
In considering the reasons my interviewees stated for pursuing their careers in these 
government or NGO positions, perhaps the clearest trend is that these interviewees chose their 
careers based on a compromise of personal convictions with necessity. Some found employment 
in the Roma industry more easily than in other sectors, and developed their careers accordingly. 
Others were involved in Roma issues throughout their education, making their transition to NGO 
or government work involving Roma issues easy and desirable. Even for those who did not 
expressly state a desire to enter a job involving Roma issues, however, an active desire to help 
the Roma in Romania was always presented as central to their work.  
Government work aimed toward Roma integration was generally depicted as farther-
reaching than NGO efforts; the ability to affect more people by working for a national 
government was even cited as a reason to switch from NGO to government work: 
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An NGO can produce only very limited changes, and NGO can have very limited 
influence, it cannot elaborate public policy. It has short term and segmented influences 
on issues. If you work for a government agency you can have a global view. You can 
pick up one good practice an NGO does, and that’s what I have done. You can 
transform it or make it part of public policy.  So it’s very different if you work for one 
hundred persons in an NGO and if you work for twenty thousand persons in a large 
government structure. [Interview 2.3] 
 
This argument was enforced by the example of the health mediators– a project first elaborated by 
the Bucurest-based NGO called Romani CRISS, and funded by the World Bank in the mid- 
1990s. Roma people who were respected by the local communities in which they were employed 
were trained as health mediators, whose duties involved “fostering mutual trust” between 
medical staff and public authorities and the Roma communities, encouraging pre- and post-natal 
care as well as providing information on family planning, promoting hygiene and proper 
nutrition, facilitating health insurance coverage, and mobilizing community members to 
participate in health campaigns, amongst other things (Harda and Florea 2006).  
In 2002, the government began collaborating with the Romani CRISS in order to translate 
the highly successful program into public policy. The public administration of Roma health 
mediators has been so successful since then that the Romanian form of this program is hailed as 
the most successful one in Europe (Harda and Florea 2006:5). As my interviewee pointed out, 
fifteen years ago, there were a handful of these mediators working in communities across 
Romania supported by an NGO. Now, six hundred health mediators are employed and paid for 
by local councils across the state (Interview 2:4). 
Yet the government does not always hold a clear advantage over NGO efforts precisely 
because government policies take longer to institute and, in some cases, may be less responsive 
to local needs than local NGO efforts. The process of decentralization following the end of 
communism in Romania has been a slow one. While the current government is in favor of state 
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decentralization, “most of the decisions are central, and this generates frustration at the local 
level” (Interview 2:5).  
The process of decentralization is important in the efforts to aid Roma in need because no 
community has the exact same set of problems as any other; therefore, local councils need to 
implement projects based on the needs expressed by the local Roma communities. For instance, 
depending on the general education levels and linguistic abilities of adults in a community, 
projects for professional qualifications need to be tailored. And while the regional governmental 
office for Roma integration usually understands the different needs of the different communities 
in its domain, the more centralized approach to these issues can slow down community actions 
(Interview 2:6).  
NGOs are generally considered faster-paced and more responsive to local needs, since 
they often only have the resources to approach issues in a handful of communities rather than 
across the country. However, NGOs can benefit from having stronger affiliations with 
government agencies, since there is a flow of funding from the government. 
One of my interviewees was the head of such a Roma NGO, which was started in 1990 as 
“subordinate” to the Roma Party, thereby giving the NGO a “bit of power” (Interview 8:1). This 
NGO approached the Roma population in terms of ‘social problems,’ meaning marginalization, 
poverty, and discrimination, and ‘cultural problems,’ meaning a lack of support for Roma music, 
dance, and language (Interview 8).  
Unlike the government projects, the initiatives of this NGO isolated certain problems and 
approached them piece by piece, rather than approaching the issues of integration ‘universally.’ 
The projects of the NGO focused on support to cultural projects such as dance troupes; it also 
provides significant support for Roma students and Roma prisoners. Finally, the NGO is also 
  49 
involved in a historical project to unearth evidence of medical experimentation on Roma during 
the Holocaust in an attempt to highlight the destruction of the Gypsy population at the time– 
something that is rarely acknowledged as a significant issue (Interview 8:1-2). 
NGO and Government Projects for the Roma of Romania 
 Most of the efforts of Roma NGOs and government projects that are aimed toward the 
Roma population involve issues of unemployment, poverty, educational segregation, and 
discrimination. The workers whom I interviewed readily understood that these problems were 
connected, and therefore any action taken to solve these problems must involve a number of 
issues simultaneously for the results to be sustainable and positive. As a head of a governmental 
department on Roma integration told me: 
It is in vain to go in and facilitate school-going and you have children of 
vulnerable groups go to school, but you neglect the family. Then the parents, in 
some cases, tell us “How can I send a child to school and he has no shoes and no 
proper clothing?” …So what we are trying to do when we do these integrated 
programs that have many tasks is trying to help the community as a whole, 
globally, not just one aspect. [Interview 2:5] 
 
This comment demonstrates a very active awareness of the way in which educational 
segregation, poverty, and ‘vulnerability’ in the sense of marginalization are mutually reinforcing 
issues that must be tackled together. 
One of my interviewees works in a national department for Roma within the Romanian 
government aimed specifically at “improving the Roma condition” (Interview 2:1). This 
department was established in 2001 as part of a ten-year initiative to “integrate” the Roma in 
Romania. Initially the department was extremely small, but grew rapidly and gained a significant 
amount of autonomy from the overarching governmental institution aimed at interethnic relations 
in which it was initially embedded. As of 2004, this department was able to act relatively 
independent of other offices, and was able to establish its own ties to all levels of government, 
  50 
including national-, county-, and local-level structures. It also gained the ability to implement 
policies (Interview 2:2). Throughout the first few years, the department for Roma integration 
financed “infrastructure development” in Roma communities, building schools and 
reconstructing houses (Interview 2:3).  
Changing policies within changing political opportunity structures 
With EU accession in 2007, however, new funds for Roma integration became available, 
and this government office “changed its approach” to Roma integration to fit EU approaches 
(Interview 2:3). As my interviewee explained, the national office for Roma integration was 
“running” six EU “structural fund programs,” all of which have the goal of “investing into 
people and human resources.” Alongside these European projects, Romania is also running 
several national programs that are overseen by this office (Interview 2:5). In these Romanian 
programs, for instance, workers enter Roma communities and “organize the local community” 
and create local initiative groups to assess the needs and the desires of the community; projects 
can be implemented to address infrastructure development as well as human resource 
development through educational or social programming. It is noteworthy that grants for these 
types of programs are granted to local councils on a competitive basis (Interview 2:4).  
Proposals to this department for grant money for Roma integration projects are judged 
according to the applicability and relevance to the community as well as how likely the project is 
to succeed. Because of the diversity of the Roma population and the diversity between Roma 
communities, projects are rarely applicable across settings. For instance, in: 
one [Roma] community where the education level is a bit higher and the people are 
more assimilated, there you can more easily influence the human capital in comparison 
with so-called traditional communities where the formal education is very low. So we 
usually know these communities, and we can make recommendations for one or the 
other project, whichever is more suitable for the community. [Interview 2:6] 
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Clearly, one type of project that the Romanian government funds for Roma integration is local 
projects that are tailored to the needs of individual communities. As noted above, however, these 
projects are often elaborated by NGOs and funded by the government, rather than elaborated by 
the government itself. In cases where these types of projects are not created by NGOs, they come 
from local councils based on the recommendations of local, influential Roma or Roma 
councilors.  
 The national government and its Roma departments serve not only to control large, EU 
structural funds and implement national policies, but also oversee the local implementation of the 
myriad other Roma projects happening throughout the country. In this way, government 
employees constantly interact with NGO workers and their projects, and creatively draw from 
these projects to create policies for Roma integration.  
The Roma Political Party 
The link between NGOs and the government does not end here, however; some of the 
most mentioned partnerships in the process of Roma integration are between the Roma Party 
(Partida Romilor) and various NGOs.  
The Roma political party is the national party representing the Romani minority in 
Romania. As such, it has one guaranteed seat in the Chamber of Deputies which can be increased 
if the votes surpass the required five percent mark, which it has not done since its establishment 
in 1990. Party representatives are appointed locally, and are situated within local councils. The 
appointment of these representatives occurs through a combination of party sponsorship and an 
assessment of the popularity of the candidate with the local community. Ideally, local 
communities support all the appointments made. These representatives serve as nodes of 
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connection between local communities and the national Party. The relative success of the Roma 
Party and the links between local and national interests will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
 The approaches of NGOs and government offices in their work with the Roma illustrate a 
number of points about the problem of Roma integration and attempts at mobilization: firstly, 
Rome elites are diverse but often come from a considerably different background than non-elite 
Roma. Secondly, Roma advocates face the paradox that the diversity of the Roma population 
necessitates local responses while the prevalence of social and economic marginalization 
amongst Gypsies in Romania requires nothing less than well-funded, coherent national strategies 
of integration.  
 As regional Roma elites move between local communities, Roma NGOs, and conferences 
with national Roma leaders, they symbolically navigate this paradox. With the integration of 
Romania into the EU, external pressures for integration of the Roma have increased 
significantly, and Roma advocacy has gained higher priority across the nation. Yet there is still 
“a lack of capacity” to deal with the “complex and multi-dimensional nature of the problem” as 
well as a “vast gap” between “operational reality” and policy (European Commission 2004:16). 
And these regional elites are constantly reminded, by virtue of their roles as mediators between 
the national project and local realities, that links between the Roma movement and grassroots 
Gypsies are weak.  
The Roma elites in my research are those that are most often held accountable for the 
disjuncture between policy and practice, not because they have control of the reality of 
integration, but because they are the most accessible segment of the Roma political elite. They 
carry the brunt of the burden of accountability to local Gypsies, while those with more power 
and influence on the national level of the movement are relatively safe from direct challenges. 
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Yet as mediators between the national and the local, I will argue in Chapter 5, these regional 
elites are in a crucial position to aid the Roma movement in gaining legitimacy on the local level, 
since the lack of legitimacy is a direct reflection of the weakness of the link between these levels. 
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Chapter 4: The Settlement 
 
 
Introduction 
The experiences of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe are almost universally described 
in terms of problems. The Gypsies living in the Roma settlement on the edge of an old industrial 
town– a segregated settlement that I will refer to as the Settlement– like many reports and 
government officials, describe their lives in terms of problems and victimization. Yet there are 
significant differences in the ways in which the discussions of problems are utilized on the local 
level versus the national and international level. The way in which Gypsies play with issues of 
identity and leadership through their discussions of problems suggest that the vocabulary of 
victimization has been politicized on the local level. These ‘victims’ are in fact using the 
discourse of victimization to challenge national and international visions of Roma ethnicity and 
representation, reworking a discussion in which they are cast as apolitical entities to redefine 
legitimacy in the case of Roma elites and activists. 
National and international actors assessing the ‘condition’ of Roma in the EU often focus 
on problems. “The Situation of the Roma in an Enlarged European Union,” a report sponsored 
by the European Commission, is standard in its assessment of the Roma as a population facing a 
considerable degree of both social and economic exclusion. The report notes that “throughout 
Europe Roma…live in sub-standard accommodation characterized by a “ghettoisation,” 
inadequate infrastructure and services, segregation from other settlements, a high incidence of 
disease and threat of eviction” (European Commission 2004:2-3). Roma face discrimination in 
access to healthcare services because of “persistent discrimination,” and “there is strong 
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evidence of reduced life expectancies among all Roma, Gypsies, and Travellers” (European 
Commission 2004:2-3). Despite unemployment rates amongst many Roma that continue to be 
“as high as 80 percent in new Member States,” these states “fail to target” the Roma as a group 
in need of specific accommodations in their National Action Plans. Finally, the report warns, 
“social protection systems across Europe often allow Romani individuals to slip through the 
safety net, either deliberately or through neglect” (European Commission 2004:2-3). In a report 
of Roma in Romania from 2001, researchers state that “economically, the Roma population is the 
most disadvantaged in Romania” (O'Grady and Tarnovschi 2001:12) and studies done by the 
European Commission (2004) concluded Roma households are “over-represented in the lowest 
quintiles of disposable household income and the majority of the Roma are living below the 
poverty line” (Rat 2005:6-7).  
  Since Roma are less fully engaged in the formal labor market than Romanians, “most 
Roma either do not participate in social-insurance schemes (other than health-insurance) or their 
period of contribution is too short to entitle them to insurance-based benefits” (Rat 2005:8). 
When Roma are employed, they are often the first to be let go when downsizing is deemed 
necessary by employers (O'Grady and Tarnovschi 2001:12-13). The length of employment, then, 
is generally unreliable. Furthermore, in Romania in 2000, only 12.5 percent encompassed a 
wage-earner with a working contract– a basic requirement to be entitled to social insurance 
benefits. Of those Roma in Romania who reported engaging in regular or temporary working 
activities, 84 percent reported doing so without a contract (Rat 2005:12). Therefore state 
pensions, insurance-based paid maternity leave and parental child-care leave have relatively 
lower influence on the well-being of Roma households than those of the non-Roma” (Rat 
2005:8).  
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The life expectancy of Roma in Romania is also estimated to be 15 to 20 years shorter 
than the life expectancy of non-Roma Romanians, with Roma life expectancy averaging between 
50 and 55 years. This, researchers postulate, is at least partially due to “substandard living 
conditions” and the fact that Roma “prefer not to [go] to the hospital” (O'Grady and Tarnovschi 
2001:12-13). This is seen as a result of anti-Roma discrimination within medical settings, which 
has gained considerable attention from NGO and governmental institutions in an effort to 
address public health needs.  
Entering the Settlement 
In entering the Settlement, I believe that people were predisposed to discuss their 
problems with me. Most outsiders come into Gypsy communities to discuss issues that need to 
be fixed, and since the Settlement is a poor one, it is not an exception. Also, a discussion of 
grievances might have been considered less invasive to privacy than a discussion of other aspects 
of life with an outsider. Roma problems are very much part of public discourse, whereas other 
aspects of Gypsy life are less well-known and less widely discussed.  
Yet the way in which my interviewees framed these discussions indicated that these 
issues were not merely apolitical descriptions of everyday life. Despite their poverty and 
problems, these interviewees "appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade or transform" discourses 
about them rather than being passive recipients of social meaning (Brubaker 2006:170). In this 
chapter, I work from the premise that these Gypsies have agency in their presentation of their 
lives to me, and chose to emphasize problems over other aspects of their lives when talking to 
me.  
The way in which the people I interviewed in the Settlement presented their lives and 
values to me reflects their conceptualization not only of what it means to be Gypsy in their 
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community, but also constructs a narrative of what it means to be a legitimate Roma leader in 
Romania. Their discussions suggest that the vocabulary of problems and problem solving is tied 
closely to conceptualizations of Gypsyness and leadership, such that leaders are defined by their 
ability and willingness to solve Gypsy problems rather than by the fact that they are of ‘Roma’ 
origin and are in a position of power.  
 In order to illustrate the ways in which this community thinks about Gypsyness and 
leadership through their discussion of their problems, I will first outline the views of Gypsies I 
interviewed on the issues facing their community. Then, I will transition to the way in which 
they talk about local leadership in dealing with these issues. Finally, I will consider some of the 
ways in which local leaders talk about the problems facing this community and how they frame 
their roles as leaders.  
Discussion of problems and issues facing the Settlement community 
I was first introduced to the Settlement through a contact at the local school. My 
interpreter and I travelled from the City to the center of the town in which the Settlement is 
located, and took a taxi to reach the outer limits of the town. We stopped in front of an old 
school. As we walked into the schoolyard and spotted the children running around on the dirt 
playground and the teachers smoking by the door, I noticed the differences between this place 
and the other Romanian schools I had seen. The playground was bare dirt with a single rusty pole 
sticking out of the ground in the back. Behind the pole stood an uneven concrete wall behind 
which shacks with tin roofs were visible. The lower part of the school’s old white walls were 
covered in a gradient of mud that slowly gave way to off-white paint. The windows had 
communist-era burglar bars covering them, and a number of windows were cracked and broken. 
Many of the children were running around barefoot, and most were wearing clothes that were 
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worn with age. As I looked over at the teachers, I noticed that the man standing closest to us had 
a number of teeth missing– which surprised me since he appeared to be in his early forties.  
The teachers were the first to spot us, their conversation halting in its tracks; the 
children’s movements soon followed. For a second, everything seemed to freeze and it felt like 
every pair of eyes was focused on us. The moment passed, and the younger children resumed 
their play. The teachers and the older children began talking again, periodically looking over at 
us. I had the distinct feeling that I was trespassing. My interpreter moved away from the noise to 
call the person we were supposed to meet. As I stood there trying to look both friendly and 
undisturbed by the attention I was getting, a teenage boy marched up to me, grabbed my arm, 
and started laughing and shouting something to the teachers and older students.  
When my interpreter came back, she explained to me that he was confirming that we 
spoke Romanian, not Romani. At that point, our audience seemed confused as to why we were 
speaking English, and my interpreter introduced me as an American student. The boy let go of 
my arm and ran off to rejoin his peers as our interviewee came out from the school to greet us 
and take us to her classroom for the interview. 
This scene lends itself to descriptions that emphasize otherness—the marginality of the 
settlement, the poverty, the naïve curiosity about outsiders and foreigners, the joviality of the 
children who are playing in the mud, seemingly unaware that there are paved streets, clean 
grassy yards, schools with computers, and eclectic coffee shops with customers discussing 
philosophy and texting on their iPhones just a few miles away. In the popular imagination, 
Gypsies are free spirits who do not want to join the rat race and live in apartments in cities with 
nine to five jobs. They work only insofar as they have an immediate need for cash; they do not 
plan ahead or save. They are the masters of living in the moment.  
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The reality, in this settlement at least, is quite the opposite. People in the Settlement are 
not isolated from life in the town. They shop in the town, catch buses through it, and search for 
jobs in local stores. In fact, community members are  aware that they are much poorer than the 
surrounding residents, and often talk wistfully about finding steady employment. Yet humor 
punctuates their vocal complaints of discrimination, and they carry on with community life 
despite hardships. But in talking to me, emphasized that some aspects of their lives could be 
made easier with steady incomes and permanent housing.  
In the Settlement, houses are crammed into narrow lanes with little space between them, 
and range from permanent structures built mostly out of bricks and wood to semi-permanent 
ones built with plywood and supplemented with cardboard. Most of the houses “don’t have any 
toilets… [or] sewage” (Interview 3:3). Until three or four years ago, the settlement had no 
municipal means of disposing of their waste, and had a “big pile of trash on [the] field” at one 
edge of the settlement. Many, if not most, of the members of the community live “without gas, 
electricity, or anything” (Interview 3:4).   
An elderly woman whom I interviewed on the doorstep of her single-room house amidst 
a crowd of onlookers captured much of the sentiment of worry about the future of the community 
in her discussion of her family’s monetary troubles. She has four children, eighteen 
grandchildren, and six great-grandchildren– yet none of the adults are formally employed. The 
whole family is dependent on welfare and scarce opportunities for informal day labor. She 
receives her pension, and her children receive a “child allowance” each month– a meager sum 
meant to help with the costs of the family (Interview 4:1).  
Voicing a common belief that Gypsies were much better off during communism, she 
asserts that under Ceauescu, “everything was good, there was food, it was cheaper…. Everyone 
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was working then.” Before the political change, she insists, “there weren’t these problems of 
people not being able to afford to live, and to kill themselves, to kill each other” (Interview 4:1). 
The school mediator, a popular local leader who is affiliated with the Roma Party, interrupts to 
reinforce this point: “Under Ceauescu,” he says,  “there wasn’t such a big Roma population 
here. There used to be more Romanians than Roma in the past” (Interview 4:1).  
He explains that the settlement grew and became a Gypsy ghetto after the end of 
communism, whereas previously this poor community had an ethnic composition more 
representative of Romania’s ethnic composition. The Roma people, he explains, were the first to 
lose their positions in the factories and were unable to enter the skilled labor market. Now, with 
the widespread economic troubles, the Romanian government has been forced to make cuts to 
their welfare and pensions. These cuts, the mediator insists, came as a surprise for most 
community members who had voted for the President and interpreted this as a betrayal since so 
many Roma depend on these government sums (Interview 4:1). 
Changing basis for poverty: Socialism and Post-Socialism 
This discussion highlights another aspect of this community’s experience of poverty: that 
the basis for poverty can shift along with political regimes. In communist societies in Central 
and Eastern Europe, poverty was "mainly a demographic phenomenon." Roma who had single 
mothers and multiple siblings, for instance, were very likely to experience poverty until such a 
time as they were old enough to work. As mentioned in Chapter 2, with the deindustrialization 
after 1989, education became highly predictive of income levels– (Ladányi and Szelényi 
2006:155). In post-socialist Romania, Gypsies are more likely to experience poverty than 
Romanians primarily because of lack of formal education and technical training. 
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 Education 
Since education became increasingly important as a means to find employment and avoid 
poverty in post-socialist Romania, it featured consistently in my interviews. Many in this 
community simply did not have sufficient formal education to qualify for most jobs in the new 
economy. As an unemployed young man said, a large number of the residents that grew up 
within communism do not have more than a fourth grade education, and even within the younger 
generation eight years of formal education is considered prestigious (Interview 6:4).  
Three of my informants within the settlement mentioned that poverty was the primary 
barrier to education in the community. Some families could not afford to give their children more 
than one set of clothes, they said, so on laundry days, the children would have nothing to wear to 
school and would have to miss it. Given that the community was covered in dirt and most 
children did not have more than one set of clothing, laundry had to be done relatively frequently 
and could cause a child to miss school if, as is likely, some of those laundry days happened to 
coincide with school days. Similarly, when the children’s shoes wore out or their only pair of 
clothes were torn, the children felt too embarrassed to attend school.  
Parents also felt pressure to provide the children with pocket money when they attended 
school in order for the kids to be able to buy snacks, which was simply outside the budgets of 
many families (Interview 4:3). Though families did not explicitly raise the issue, a teacher in the 
community school mentioned that the inability for many families to provide breakfast to students 
made the students difficult to manage until such a time as the school provided the free lunch, 
after which students were more able to concentrate (Interview 3). 
With the exception of the last issue, these concerns are actually more a reflection of the 
social expectations regarding caring for one’s family than literal barriers to education. The 
relevance of these statements to community policing and resistance to Roma stereotypes will be 
  62 
further discussed below. For now, it is important to note that my Gypsy interviewees experienced 
poverty and the social perception of poverty as a disabling factor in regards to education. 
The school mediator, whose job it is to encourage school attendance, knows both how 
crucial formal education can be for professional success in the new Romania and how difficult it 
can be to gain that formal education as an adult. Having dropped out of school before getting a 
degree, he is currently enrolled in high school to get his diploma as a means to forward his own 
career and to set an example for the community. Yet as his daughter-in-law points out, “some 
people think it’s a joke that he goes to school at his age” (Interview 6:3). Adults in the 
community face the prospect of needing more education to get jobs, yet they may feel 
embarrassed to re-enter school.  
Even more problematic than humiliation at the prospect of going to school again is the 
widespread distrust that education makes it easier to secure a job as a Gypsy. Many Settlement 
residents were concerned at the apparent lack of employment opportunities after graduating from 
the local school, since a number of them had a high school diploma yet were unable to find a job. 
“A lot of parents say to their children, ‘It doesn’t matter if you go to school because you won’t 
find a job anyway,’” said a young unemployed, high-school educated woman to me (Interview 
6:3). This woman had worked for some time as a seamstress, but had lost her job when the textile 
workshops in the area closed at the beginning of the recession. At the time of the interview, she 
had been unable to secure any other type of employment, and was hoping to use her family 
network to get a job. As her case, and many other young adults’ experiences demonstrated, when 
the economy was doing poorly even an education did not prevent Roma from being the first to be 
laid-off. 
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It is important to point out that the only type of education available in the Settlement past 
eighth grade is professional education rather than general education. In Romania, professional 
schools give occupational qualifications much like technical schools do in the U.S., except that 
the training supplants other high school studies. Generally, professional education does not allow 
for advancement into tertiary education. Furthermore, in Romania, entrance exams are required 
for all forms of secondary school. After eighth grade, students must take exams to enter into 
professional schools (which require passing mathematics and Romanian language), or general 
education high schools (which has additional academic requirements) (Interview 1:2).  
Thus, even for those who complete the eighth grade and wish to continue their education, 
options are limited. The only training the local school provides past the eighth grade is two years 
of sewing qualification for women, and auto-mechanics training for men through the local 
professional school (Interview 6:1). And qualification for a general education in a nearby city 
requires additional exams and often additional tutoring as well as the ability to pay for a student 
to travel to a non-local school. Few, if any, of the children in the community have the option of 
commuting to school elsewhere, since transport costs are prohibitive and parents are unable to 
monitor their children's behavior (Interview 6:2).  Adults that graduate from this school compete 
for work as seamstresses and auto-mechanics, or they work as unqualified and often 
undocumented daily laborers. The inability of individuals in the community with the professional 
qualifications to find employment has added to a sense of cynicism about the value of education 
(Interview 6:3). 
Language 
Apart from needing more formal education in order to qualify for jobs, some of the older 
generations are not fluent in Romanian. The oldest generation of Roma, who were part of the 
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community that existed here before communism, speaks a dialect of Romani that draws from 
Hungarian (Interview 6:5). Most of the community speaks a less Hungarianized form of Romani 
as their first language. Most of the Gypsies in the community who were educated before the end 
of communism speak Romanian as a second language, and often are not fluent enough to use 
Romanian in social settings or in the workplace. This is partially because Romanian is learnt 
almost exclusively through Romanian language education within the school, and many people in 
the settlement do not have much formal education (Interview 5:1). Needless to say, this poses a 
serious problem in the search for employment from Romanian employers or institutions.  
Anti-Roma Sentiment 
In the discussions of unemployment, nearly all of my informants mentioned anti-Gypsy 
sentiment. Only one informant in the settlement did not mention discrimination toward Roma 
explicitly, though even she mentioned that “Roma people and the Romanians don’t really work 
together well,” and that problems can arise because of “the differences in ethnicity” (Interview 
5:1). The awareness of prejudice by community members is best captured in this statement, 
which ties together issues of unemployment and lack of education through an analysis of 
discrimination: 
For example, [a Gypsy man] goes to get a job somewhere … eighty percent of Roma 
don’t have that much schooling. Then if he goes to work in construction, to build 
materials, he’s told ‘no.’ But not because he cannot work, but because of his ethnicity. 
[The employer] thinks “Oh yeah, this person is going to steal.” There is this prejudice. 
[Interview 6:5] 
 
According to this man, Gypsies are limited by their lack of education in seeking employment, 
but even in their quest to find jobs for which they are qualified, they are often met with rejection 
because they are Gypsy. 
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In general, my informants agreed that interactions with Romanians are made more 
difficult by signs of Gypsyness. In Romania, darker skin color, illiteracy, and a ‘different’ way of 
life, often marked by marginality and poverty, are considered to be markers of Gypsyness 
(Ladányi and Szelényi 2006:141).17 
When talking about the reality of categorization, a couple of my informants in the 
settlement mentioned that some level of passing, or at least an active distancing from these 
stereotypical Gypsy characteristics in public, is convenient in everyday interactions with 
Romanians. Since some Gypsies are not native Romanian speakers, language and intonation is 
another means by which Gypsies can be identified. Those Roma who are fluent in Romanian 
may try to “control [their accent] when [they] go somewhere,” and follow Romanian conventions 
of greeting and interaction in an attempt to avoid being labeled as Gypsy (Interview 6:4).  
Overall, the people I interviewed felt that the lack of education and professional 
qualifications combined with Romanian racism against Gypsies helped to create and reinforce 
poverty in their community, and that this poverty caused further barriers to education and 
employment. The experience of marginalization was also seen as reinforcing the lack of 
education and employment, since people were sometimes demoralized by racist encounters and 
further discouraged from pursuing a more integrated way of life.  
Community models of ‘good’ Gypsyness 
It is of some interest that all of my interviewees in the Settlement referred to themselves 
as Gypsies (not Roma), and the term ‘Romanian’ was universally employed to mean non-
Gypsies. That is, except for those instances where my interpreter used the Romanian word ‘rom,’ 
                                            
17 In a large-scale study conducted by Ladányi and Szelényi, a sample of 296 Romanian interviewers identified 
interviewees as Roma and described their methods for performing the classification. 52 percent of interviewers 
ranked skin color as very important in Gypsy classification, 46.9% remarked that a distinct ‘way of life’ was 
important in marking Roma, and 36.5% identified language as very important in classifying Roma. 46.3% said that 
the self-identification of the interviewee was not an important factor in classifying someone as Roma. 
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after which one interviewee temporarily used the word ‘rom’ before switching back to igan, or 
gypsy.  
The most interesting distinction came from a conversation in which one young man made 
a distinction between the people in the settlement and ‘real Gypsies’ in Transylvania, and made a 
further distinction between the Gypsies in Transylvania and those Gypsies in southern Romania. 
“My grandfather was a real igan person,” he said. Real Gypsies “have different occupations, 
like making clothes, making pots, singing, building roofs and working with iron. Every person 
was doing something in the community. But in time, these things are lost” (Interview 6:5) He 
adds that real Gypsies speak real Romani, not “different dialects” like his community speaks. He 
then draws a further distinction between Gypsies from Transylvania and those of southern 
Romania, mentioning that those in the south have different dances and different food. They are 
also seen differently than Gypsies in Transylvania. He ends this line of thought with the assertion 
that “this community is seen as the worst one in the city, but the nicest people are here” 
(Interview 6:6).  
The way in which he drew these lines of distinction are telling of the types of Gypsyness 
that he sees as desirable, and aligns well with the ways in which other community members 
talked about what types of lifestyles were acceptable in their community. The idea of having lost 
touch with ‘real’ Gypsy culture– including non-Romanian ways of life and traditional 
occupations– is pervasive. The discussion of employment made it clear that no traditional crafts 
remained in this community, yet the loss of craft was not mourned; traditional crafts require the 
makers to travel for at least part of the year to sell their wares. Community members mourned 
instead the loss of standard, formal factory employment close by. 
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Speaking Romanian rather than Romani in order to get a job was also considered wise. A 
number of interviewees emphasized the importance of increasing knowledge of Romanian in the 
community, and even disparaged Romanian attempts to institute Romani language classes in 
their school: 
First people should learn Romanian and be able to master it, because when you go 
somewhere you’re supposed to talk Romanian because if you speak Romani nobody 
will know what you want to say. You don’t go to the store and ask in Romani, you ask 
in Romanian.  [Interview 5:3] 
Similarly, the Romani and Romanian language teacher at the local school insisted: 
 
I teach bilingually but I emphasize the development of vocabulary in Romanian. 
Because we’re in Romania. I love Romani, but I think it’s a mistake. We’re not ready 
yet to have teaching in Romani language. … We don’t have any books, and you 
confuse them. You teach up to the fourth grade in Romani and then you switch to 
Romanian… The children can’t keep up, and then you get real segregation. [Interview 
3:3] 
Whatever the political incentives to teach or preserve Romani, these informants had a strictly 
practical outlook that emphasized the need to be able to integrate educationally and socio-
economically. 
A number of other informants criticized those in the community who they felt did not 
make sufficient strides to integrate into Romanian society. First and foremost in these criticisms 
were those who did not get the proper amount of formal schooling. As one woman said, “a lot of 
people don’t have four classes, and cannot read, and had the chance to come here and go to the 
school and study, and didn’t go,” concluding that “there are people who just settle for less than 
others” (Interview 6.4). Another woman told me proudly that she has taught her daughter some 
English, but voiced concern, however, about the current quality of schooling. She mentioned, 
though, that the presence of the mediator himself, who is an intimidating and respected figure, 
has helped improve schooling in general (Interview 5). 
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Several people also voiced concerns over being nice Gypsies, as opposed to those 
Gypsies in other parts of the town who were rough and not considered civilized. One young 
woman insisted that their community was the nicest Gypsy community in town, but had a bad 
reputation because of “a few families who have a lot of children and don’t have control of them” 
(Interview 6:4). These families were headed by irresponsible parents who are “drinking, and not 
working,” and were thus poor. These parents “send their children to beg” rather than sending 
them to school. They give the community a “bad reputation” despite the fact that the town’s 
police know the community is not violent and is very rarely called to come to the community 
(Interview 6:4).  
Another woman similarly relates that the community is a good one, but she makes an 
exception for the disrespectful youngsters who are unemployed and bored and become violent. 
However, she insists that the school mediator, the local leader, is in control of the situation 
(Interview 5:3). Other informants expand this view, noting that some of the adults in the 
community do not understand how to be polite, and that this embarrassed the other Gypsies in 
the community (Interview 3:4; Interview 6:3). These are contrasted with the good behavior of 
upstanding Settlement residents such as the leader and a few other figures.  
Finally, as if to cement the fact that the community is a very civilized one, a man 
recounts his work in the downtown area as a bus ticket inspector. His co-workers and bosses, 
who he insists did not realize he was Roma, were worried that he did not treat the town’s 
Gypsies the same as he treated the Romanians on the buses. Despite pressure from his managers, 
he did not want to change his behavior toward these town Gypsies, who he felt were “very 
violent” and difficult to deal with for “a very small paycheck” (Interview 6:5).  
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The discussion of these issues suggests that community members, who consider 
themselves Gypsies rather than Roma and who do not have a neam affiliation, wish to distance 
themselves from narratives of Gypsyness that cast Gypsies as violent, lazy, welfare dependent, 
and illiterate through stressing education, commitment to work, and politeness. The norms for 
how to be a good Gypsy in this community involve successful navigation of public Romanian 
spaces, respect for elders and community leaders, and work toward education and employment. 
Gypsies in the Turda settlement are distinct from Romanians, but they are ‘moral’ the way 
Romanians are moral, and modern the way Romanians are modern. They are not ‘real,’ 
traditional Gypsies who are out of touch with the modern workforce and modern fashions. But 
they are also not violent Gypsies who have lost touch with all values. Economic hardship does 
not eliminate social expectations of providing for one’s family and being a good community 
member.  
Who is respected in the community, what they do to be respected 
In discussing the problems of the community and proper norms for behavior, I believe the 
Gypsies of the settlement framed what they believe are legitimate issues for a leader or 
representative to address, and also outlined the way in which these issues should be addressed. 
Throughout the discussions of problems, they mention the work of their local leader, the man 
who doubles both as a city council representative from the community and as a school mediator.  
In discussing the work of this leader, the emphasis is always on the fact that he has 
earned respect and obedience from the community through his good work for them. One of the 
most frequently told stories is that of the “big pile of trash” that plagued the community before 
the appointment of their leader. The dire trash situation of the community was widely ignored 
my municipal leaders until the Roma leader “went constantly to the city hall until he finally 
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managed to find some machines to clean everything” (Interview 5:2). His persistence and 
commitment to a better environment for the community paid off, and local officials finally did 
what they should have done a long time ago. Similarly, the community had mud roads that 
caused havoc whenever it rained; standing water made the whole settlement dirty and impossible 
to navigate. But when the school mediator was given his community leadership post, “he went to 
the city hall a lot and he brought stones and gravel to cover and level it up a bit” (Interview 5:2). 
Before the school mediator was appointed, children skipped school and the community 
had even lower levels of education and less Romanian training. But when the school mediator 
was put in charge, Settlement residents told me laughing, he began going around the community 
every morning and waking up any children who were not in school and chaperoning them to 
their classes. He addressed the concerns of families who felt that education was useless, and now 
school absenteeism is considerably less of an issue in the community (Interview4; Interview 5; 
Interview 6). 
As the Settlement leader himself said to questions about his job description: 
I don’t really do what I’m supposed to do. I do more. If I did only what I was told to 
do, not enough would get done... I do more volunteer work than anything. Many 
people in the community don’t know how to read and write, and even if they do, they 
don’t know how to fill in an application. And that’s why they come to me, and 
sometimes they call me at ten in the night. [Interview 3:8] 
This man’s description of his own work is echoed throughout the community as the reason the 
Gypsies in the Settlement respect him. He works harder than he is supposed to, takes individuals’ 
concerns upon himself, and is always available and ready to represent a community member at 
the city hall. Interestingly, the description of the mediator as ‘volunteer’ is repeated by others 
despite the fact that he has at least two paid positions through the city hall to work for the 
community.   
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 The local Roma leader became a leader through the intervention of a PHARE project, 
which insisted that the community choose a representative with whom they could communicate 
about project details. So the school mediator was appointed through the initiation of the PHARE 
project, but was chosen by the community. Yet not all school mediators can be considered 
community leaders, the teacher explains: 
Generally, they make themselves be listened to. It just depends on the person and how 
involved the person is in the troubles of the people. The acts they do, in time, speak for 
themselves. And not everyone does quality work. [Interview 3:7] 
 
This specific school mediator has managed to gain the trust of the community and has 
established himself as a respected leader with the right to intervene in family affairs as well as 
the right to speak for the community on the local level.  
A Gypsy woman told me that when people in the settlement encountered problems, they 
do not really trust the intentions of the city hall workers enough to approach them with their 
issues because they hold prejudices against those that are jobless. Not knowing that I have 
already met the school mediator, she tells me: “There is a leader, and people tell the leader their 
problems. The leader goes, and he puts in a lot of work for the people in the community.” He is 
usually helped, she tells me, because “he has more authority than the common person” 
(Interview 5:2). This authority in relation to the city, I am informed, comes from the fact that he 
is well-connected with local officials, he is a member of the Roma Party, and the community has 
given him permission to be their representative (Interview 6:3). 
Reframing leadership through discussions of problems 
Throughout the interviews I conducted with community members in the Settlement, it 
was repeatedly stressed that the school mediator was a respected leader because of the work that 
he did for the community, and that he would not have been considered a leader had he not done 
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this work. His leadership and representative power did not rest on his affiliation with the Roma 
Party or his appointment through PHARE. This concept was reinforced by a sociologist who 
worked with a community a walking distance away from the settlement on which I focused. This 
community often sent students to the Settlement school, and many had members of their 
extended families in the other community. This other community also had a school mediator, yet 
the Roma community she studied did not consider this mediator a leader. Rather, a teacher at the 
local school is the main leadership figure. As an explanation of this, the sociologist offered the 
following: 
Somehow… it has to do with personal traits too. The school mediator, she’s very 
young, and usually when she goes and visits the families she’s somehow scared, and 
she needs to take someone else with her. You know? And the teacher, she’s a really 
strong figure. And she has done quite a good work with the children. So they have the 
results there. [Interview 7:6] 
The legitimacy of the leader in this neighboring community, too, rests on the work that the leader 
has done for the community. 
 In Chapter 5, I will consider these foundations for a legitimate Roma leader on the local 
level in relation to the type of leadership advocated for by Roma elites. The discontinuities in the 
views of what constitutes a legitimate Roma leader from the point of view of local Gypsies and 
that of Roma elite will be discussed in relation to the unpopularity of Roma mobilization in 
Romania on the grassroots level.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will argue that the Roma living in the Settlement, though economically 
and socially marginalized, are not out of touch with Roma politics or Romanian politics more 
broadly. Rather, these Gypsies– like many other Gypsies across Central and Eastern Europe– are 
critical of Roma politics and often make deliberate decisions not to support Roma politicians, 
challenging Roma leaders through their cynical dissociation to be accountable to local needs and 
to earn grassroots support through the demonstration of positive change. 
The fact that Roma leaders mention the need for decentralization and focus on local 
communities suggests that they are aware of this issue. While they are still facing general apathy, 
Roma elites and leaders draw heavily from “non-Gypsy political modalities” to establish their 
legitimacy (Gay y Blasco 2002:180). Simultaneously, Roma elite reframe Gypsy challenges to 
Roma authority as an absence of political awareness rather than alternative, grassroots 
definitions of leadership and Gypsyness. For the elite, the lack of Gypsy support results from the 
apolitical short-sightedness that comes from conditions of Gypsy poverty. Therefore they do not 
see it as a legitimate challenge to the Roma political agenda.   
The general dismissal of Roma politics on the local level, I believe, is not a sign that local 
Gypsies are unaware of the political agendas of Roma elite. They are simply at odds with the 
Roma elite; they do not trust the Roma elite to represent their interests, and in withholding their 
support of the Roma political movement they are not politically inactive, but are challenging the 
intent and foundation of legitimacy of Roma leaders. These local Gypsies continuously model 
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the type of leadership they would support and even lament the lack of such leadership on the 
national level.  
Despite the lack of grassroots support, Roma elite are making gains for the Roma on both 
the national and international level, slowly winning over allies in powerful political bodies and 
putting Roma integration on the political agendas of both the EU and the Romanian government. 
Roma leaders continue pushing their agendas nationally and internationally, hoping to win over 
the support of local Gypsies in time. The struggle to bridge macro-level support structures with 
local political structures, however, is a significant one. Roma leaders face professional burnout 
and the threat failure as they continue sustaining what is supposed to be a popular minority rights 
movement without popular support.  
Self-Identification amongst non-elite Gypsies 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is no such thing as a singular Gypsy identity; Gypsy 
identity– like other identities– may shift over time or aspects of it may be emphasized or de-
emphasized according to context. Sometimes, Gypsy identity is anchored in corporate groups 
such as subgroups. Yet as previously discussed, these clan-like social structures have become 
less widespread, and often do not encourage endogamy to the same extent as they used to. In any 
Gypsy subgroups are useful to think through the variability of Gypsy identity. 
Some Roma whose Gypsy identity are anchored in a group make a “clear-cut distinction 
[be] between ‘[their] people’ and ‘strange people,’ where ‘[their] people’ are solely members of 
the same group, and all the rest are ‘strangers,’ both the surrounding population and other Gypsy 
groups” (Beissinger 2001:32). Yet there is considerable differentiation in how Roma belonging 
to these Gypsy groups interpret their belonging.  
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Gypsyness as performance 
Some enact their Gypsy identity with considerable pride, and place their Gypsyness front 
and center in their self-identities. The Gitanos in Jarana, for instance, “reject the label of ‘ethnic 
minority’ that is so important to the activist discourse: to them, it is the Gitanos that occupy the 
center of the world, and the non-Gypsies that are marginal and peripheral” (Gay y Blasco 
2002:186).  
Though the Gitanos of Jarana express an awareness that “there are Gitano-like 
populations in ‘all the countries of the world,’ they do not see themselves as forming with them 
‘one kind of people,’ nor do they attempt to establish any practical links with them” (Gay y 
Blasco 2002:178). In fact, Gitanos are “separated from each other” by “ethnic and religious 
affiliations, and levels of economic success, all of which weigh heavily on their imaginative 
configurations of themselves” (Gay y Blasco 2002:177). Gitano-ness “is not imposed from above 
or from the center, but rather is dependent on the performances of particular Gitano persons” 
(Gay y Blasco 2002:179). With the emphasis on the performance of a very specific, community 
interpretation of Gitano-ness, the past is “disregarded as a source of shared identity, and 
downplayed through most spheres of social life” (Gay y Blasco 2002:179).  
Ethnicity as ethnic trait 
Still others claim their ethnic identity while playing with their class identity, 
reinterpreting Gypsyness as a source of desirable characteristics that can be combined with 
Romanian sensibilities and values to create a superior type of Gypsy identity. Lăutari, members 
of the Romanian neamuri that traditionally pursues musicianship, are particularly well-known for 
this. Lăutari gained a higher social status than any other neamuri in Romania under slavery. 
Known for their musicianship, it is not uncommon to hear non-Gypsy Romanians praise the 
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skills of these Gypsies. The lăutari perform primarily for non-Roma across Romania, and thus 
have more routine, professional contact with non-Roma than many other Gypsies.  
The lăutari, historically, developed as a type of Roma elite. Gypsy musicians first began 
to become popular in this region in the 1500s (Kemény 2005:7). By the eighteenth century, 
Gypsy musicians were by far the most respected occupational group by outsiders, since Roma 
musicians were regarded as exceptional and had more access to a steady income than most 
Gypsies (Kemény 2005: 39). As Beissinger points out in her ethnographic work with the lăutari: 
Romani musicians play with the boundaries of ethnicity and class because in doing so 
they are enabled to elevate themselves, thereby gaining prestige and economic 
security. They are agents in the making of cultural difference… Through their 
discourse on ethnicity, class, culture, and politics, Romani musicians manipulate 
boundaries between themselves and others in order to associate themselves with the 
socially powerful, disassociate themselves form the powerless, and enhance their 
market niche and status. [Beissinger 2001:26] 
 
The lăutari identify primarily as musicians; the emphasis on occupation translates to their sense 
of Gypsyness, in which they “portray the ‘ethnic’ part of their identity” (Beissinger 2001:32) as 
that which gives them their musical skills. Their Gypsyness is essential but subordinate to their 
profession, which allows them to enter public spaces and be received by non-Gypsies with 
respect. 
 Roma musicians in Romania claim that they are the “most civilized and well-behaved 
igani,” and are the “most integrated” Gypsies of all. It is not uncommon for these musicians to 
“discriminate against other Roma based on their being purportedly dangerous or bad” 
(Beissinger 2001:38). In doing so, Beissinger argues, these musicians “construct a space in 
which they place themselves alongside the ‘ethical Romanians’” rather than associate with the 
“unethical” Gypsies (2001:39). Indeed, many Roma musicians have stopped learning Romani, 
and Romanian is used in their community instead. In doing so, they uphold the majority 
language as a sign of the linkage between the musicians and Romanians (Beissinger 2001:45). 
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 In regards to Roma politics, most of the lăutari “dismiss involvement in Romani political 
movements because of its perceived incompatibility with their profession” (Beissinger 2001:47).  
In Transylvania especially, the musicians refer to those pushing the Roma agenda as Gypsies 
with little power who are partaking in the politics of the capital, which has no impact on 
Transylvanian life. This political apathy, Beissinger argues, is partially a result of the fact that 
musicians, who work hard for their livings, do not have the time to partake in political 
movements. This apathy is also a projection of the musicians’ unique identity as professionals 
with a “strong affinity for the dominant culture” (Beissinger 2001:48). By ignoring Roma 
politics, Beissinger suggests, these musicians distance themselves from the stigma of Gypsyness, 
realign themselves with Romanians, and place themselves in a less controversial position vis-à-
vis their Romanian customers by staying out of the fray of Roma politics.  
Gypsyness in the Settlement 
The Roma from the Settlement whom I interviewed did not belong to a distinct neamuri; 
their community is an amalgamation of Roma from across the region who lost their jobs or could 
no longer afford to live elsewhere. Yet they share a community identity, and past-affiliations are 
not mentioned. Common experiences in the settlement have provided the means through which 
to build a new type of affiliation that stresses morality and the desire for integration, with 
community members providing contrasts of ‘bad’ or ‘backward’ Gypsies to cement their 
community aspirations. In discussing their ethnicity, they emphasize that their community is 
distinct (and superior) to other Gypsy communities, including those with neamuri identities.  
For the Gypsies from the Settlement, Gypsyness is neither performed according to group-
specific laws that are passed down through the generations, nor is it seen as a source of particular 
talent that enables upward social mobility. Rather, as members of a mixed Gypsy community 
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that is also struggling to re-enter the regular economy, Settlement Roma emphasize their desire 
to work, their ability to learn and adapt, and their esteem of moral and socially acceptable 
behavior that is compatible with Romanian social norms.  
Political implications of Gypsy identification 
Not surprisingly, the specific aspects of Gypsyness that people cling to or the boundaries 
that they create between themselves and others have implications for their reception of the Roma 
political movement.  
The Gitanos of Jarana, for instance, perform a local Gypsy ethnicity that they consider to 
be incompatible with the international focus of the Roma political movement. The musicians, 
Beissinger writes, are highly resistant to Roma politics. In a typical effort to prevent being 
grouped with other Gypsies, “several in the same village indicated that when Romani activists in 
Bucharest,” such as  Nicolae Gheorghe, a scholar-activist, and Nicolae Paun, the head of the 
Roma Party, refer to Roma,  “they mean all the other [Roma], but not lăutari” (Beissinger 
2001:46). This “rejection of political involvement,” Beissinger argues, is the result of a “distrust 
of officialdom and suspicions of what are seen as isolated, elite movements that relate little to 
their own personal lives and ongoing struggles” (2001:47). 
Beissinger’s argument, which accounts for the lack of political enthusiasm for the Roma 
movement amongst lăutari, places that dissociation at the center of their play on Gypsyness and 
class. These musicians, she argues, have no motivation to risk the foundation of their identity 
performance for a political movement that has not proven to be effective in giving the musicians 
more rights or resources. She concludes that these material and status considerations “rul[e] out 
concern for ethnic politics,” leading the lăutari to “outrightly disavow Romani political parties 
and activities designed to better their status as Roms” (Beissinger 2001:47).  
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This commentary by Beissinger is reminiscent of the attitudes of many of the regional 
Roma advocates who often implied that the work they did for the Gypsies in Transylvania was 
essential because they felt Gypsies, living in poverty, often thought too narrowly to see the 
benefits of supporting the Roma movement. Poverty and social marginalization was given as the 
reason why non-elite Gypsies tend to be short-term thinkers who do not understand how to use 
the available resources, specifically a relatively well-funded and supported ethno-political 
movement, for their own advancement.  
This view was most succinctly vocalized by a non-Roma sociologist who admitted that 
she often noticed that the Gypsies she encountered did not understand the necessity of pursuing 
longer-term goals such as education and professional training. She felt that this was not because 
of an inherent flaw in Roma ways of thinking or Gypsy culture, but rather a function of being 
poor. As a Romanian, she suggested, she would think similarly in a position of poverty: 
If I put myself in their shoes, and I think that I only have 10 Lei– this is all I have– and 
I have a starving family, no education, no prospects in finding a job, nobody I can talk 
to who can give me good advice… Perhaps I would also think short-term, no? I want 
to buy bread for my family. It’s difficult to have a long-term perspective in this 
situation. [Interview 7:9] 
In the face of material need and a lack of sources for good advice, she believes, Gypsies make 
decisions that are not conducive to long-term goals of integration. .   
The internationally-recognized Roma scholar, Nicolae Gheorghe, similarly argues that 
“many Rom[a] are politically inactive,” yet attributes it to the fact that they “were never part of 
the political process of nation-building, [and] their identity remained largely a social identity” 
(Beissinger 2001:47). In an assessment for the National Democratic Institute, researchers 
conclude that in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, “political disunity, economic hardship, and 
social stagnation conspire to suppress political aspirations and a cohesive political identity” 
(Denton 2003:1). 
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Roma participation in electoral politics 
The electoral participation (or lack thereof) of Gypsies in Central and Eastern Europe is 
influenced by many factors. Many Roma communities “have a younger age structure [which] 
means that a smaller share of their population is of voting age” (Vermeersch 2005:459). In a 
survey of voting patterns of Roma in Hungary, Ladányi concludes that fifty-four percent of those 
individuals claiming a Roma identity “were willing to participate in elections,” which was not 
much lower that the sixty percent of non-Roma willing to vote in the upcoming elections. In 
Slovakia, poor municipalities had a very low Roma participation rate; despite this, voter turnout 
on the level of districts never fell below fifty eight percent (Vermeersch 2005: 460).  
In Romania, the young age of the Roma population can certainly be a factor in low voter 
support of Roma political parties. Perhaps more relevant to voting practices is the estimation that 
20 percent of Romania’s Roma population lacks government-issued identification cards. This 
makes registration for voting impossible  (Denton 2003:5). Yet as indicated repeatedly by NGO 
and government officials as well as the Gypsies in the Settlement, the lack of ID is addressed by 
proactive measures instituted by city halls in many locales. Though it could certainly prove to be 
a significant obstacle to many individuals, the city in which the Settlement is located addresses 
these concerns by making replacement or provision of I.D.s easy.  
As one local Roma leader described it to me, temporary I.D.s that are valid for a year can 
easily be gotten from the local courthouse. Towns have decreased the restrictions for getting 
these papers, even turning a blind eye to those people with no permanent addresses in order to 
issue them identity documents. Three hundred such identity documents had recently been issued 
to Settlement residents through the efforts of local leaders and local Roma Party officials 
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(Interview 3:4). Offhand comments by people in the settlement further suggest that people 
participated in the last national election (Interview 4). 
Gypsy responses to Roma political movement 
The lack of popular support for Roma movements across Central and Eastern Europe is 
widely noted (Denton 2005; Beissinger 2001; Gay y Blasco 2002; Klímová 2002). Whatever the 
creation of the term Roma and the rise of Roma NGOs and political parties did for international 
discourses and funding for Roma projects, it "did not persuade potential participants in a large-
scale ethnic movement to start effectively participating in such a movement through electoral 
politics" (Vermeersch 2005:459). Yet unlike many observers suggest, the lack of involvement in 
electoral politics does not equate with an absence of Gypsies from formal or informal politics. 
On the contrary, Roma participate in general elections despite structural barriers on both the 
national and local levels. They simply choose not to support the Roma movement, which is in 
itself a political stance.  
Given that there are significant forces that are pushing toward mobilization, including 
governmental structures that are increasingly receptive to Roma representation and EU funding 
of integration and aid initiatives aimed at Gypsies, the failure of Roma leaders to mobilize 
grassroots support is perplexing. In order to address this failure of Roma leaders to gain local 
support, I will consider relationship between national and local political and aid structures, and 
the perception of Roma leaders by Gypsies in Romania. I will argue that grassroots support is not 
crystallizing because national Roma leaders have not sufficiently established their legitimacy 
according to local standards.  
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The critique of multiculturalism and non-Gypsy political modalities 
Peter Vermeersch’s work on Roma political mobilization in Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia suggests that the Roma mobilization project has failed to garner public support 
because of the political opportunity and framing structures available to Roma mobilizers. 
Vermeersch argues that Roma activists and leaders “make their voice heard successfully by 
engaging in identity politics” (Vermeersch 2005: 454) within a political arena that filters claims 
to rights through the increasingly dominant prism of multiculturalism. In so doing, Roma leaders 
can choose to foreground marginality within their identity movement at the risk of reifying 
marginality as an ethnic trait of Roma. Conversely, they can choose to preference ethnic and 
cultural identity over those issues facing many Roma at the risk of losing pertinence to those 
Gypsies who are looking to their leaders to address issues of unemployment, poverty, and social 
marginality (Vermeersch 2005). 
Vermeersch is not alone in pointing to the difficulties leaders face in posing their political 
agendas in such a way as to gain both national and international support while also appealing to 
marginal Gypsies (Vermeersch 2005:456). “One of the most striking characteristics of this 
movement,” Paloma Blasco writes, “is its heavy ideological and practical dependence on non-
Gypsy political modalities and structures” (Gay y Blasco 2002:180). The success of Roma 
politicians and activists in gaining international and national support, Blasco argues, rests on the 
tribute Roma leaders pay to non-Roma political bodies and discourses, which has in turn allowed 
non-Gypsies to accept Roma attempts at self-legitimization. These minority discourses, Blasco 
argues, “draws heavily on dominant western models of ethnicity, identity and personhood” while 
“contrast[ing] strongly” with those models upheld by the local Gitanos with whom the author 
does fieldwork (Gay y Blasco 2002:179). 
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In making his argument, Vermeersch draws on interviews with Roma organizers and 
leaders. In his work with Roma elites in the countries surrounding Romania, Vermeersch 
describes a distinct emphasis of Roma leaders on the project of identity formation at the expense 
of issue-area projects. In fact, the focus on identity made some Roma activists “reluctant to 
expose situations of marginality in their mobilization attempts” because they feared their 
portrayals of Roma need would reify Roma difference and support negative stereotypes 
(2005:461). Therefore, Roma leaders in these countries “rarely made unambiguous statements 
about whether “they were in favor of group-specific measures, such as affirmative action, 
desegregation, education in the Romani language, or the recognition of the Romani language as a 
minority language” (Vermeersch 2005:462).  
Vermeersch argues that the problems of framing facing Roma activists are the same 
problems mobilizers of any multicultural movement would face.18 Leaders’ politics often portray 
a more unified group, glossing over internal dissention and heterogeneity, and can add to a sense 
of difference between majority and minority populations. This, he argues, is especially likely in 
situations where the “identity labels in question have very negative connotations and when 
political mobilization is hindered by a series of socio-economic obstacles” (Vermeersch 
2005:465). 
Given these obstacles, Vermeersch suggests that the Roma mobilization project might 
benefit from making a clearer distinction between “identity- and interest-based advocacy,” 
(Vermeersch 2005:469) such that Roma activists may address the structural inequality that 
Gypsies face without making it a part of the identity movement. In this way, he argues, Roma 
leaders can both build a positive Roma identity that does not alienate Gypsies who fear 
                                            
18 Vermeersch defines the Roma mobilization project in Europe as multicultural because it attempts to encompass 
so many types of Gypsies that do not consider themselves to be an ethnicity. 
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association with a stigmatized movement, while remaining relevant to poor Gypsy communities. 
The work of activists would no longer be plagued by fears of reinforcing stigma, since “ethnic 
and cultural identities… [would] only [be] important because unequal access is often 
experienced or socially organized in terms of cultural and ethnic difference” (Vermeersch 
2005:469).  
Obstacles to Roma mobilization popularity in Romania 
Though Vermeersch’s approach is remarkably useful in pointing to some of the reasons 
for the failure of popular mobilization of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, my research on 
local, non-elite concerns over Roma politics in Romania adds another dimension of critique. 
Vermeersch points out that interest-based advocacy should be strengthened and divorced from 
identity advocacy because the Roma are not responding well to the marriage of Roma ethnicity 
to humanitarian aid. Vermeersch’s argument resonates well with the interviews I conducted with 
local Roma elites. Yet my interviews with poor Gypsies, who routinely link their ethnicity to 
‘problems’ and constantly reinforce that leadership is only legitimate to the extent that it pays 
attention to these linkages, suggest that something else is at work in the unpopularity of the 
Roma political movement amongst non-elite Roma in Romania.  
Romania stands out in the region as the site of the very successful Roma Party, which has 
held a monopoly on Roma politics since its inception (Denton 2003:12). The leaders of the Roma 
Party as well as Roma NGOs are by no means ambiguous in their goals for mobilization and 
integration. Leaders routinely list the need to address segregation, education, unemployment, and 
the desire to establish Romani as a minority language. The Roma Party is known for its linkages 
to Roma NGOs, and there are many powerful Roma NGOs with significant funding that 
routinely advocate for integration and aid.  
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Issues of linking marginality to Roma identity: Elites 
The issues of integration and marginalization are routinely raised both by local leaders in 
the Settlement and by regional elites in the City, as is apparent in my previous discussion of 
NGO and government strategies of Roma integration. The only ambiguity centered on the use of 
Romani in school, where regional elites were very enthusiastic but local leaders suggested that 
schools did not have the resources to properly institute Romani language education. Even the 
local teacher who opposed the use of Romani language education professed great respect for this 
trend, lamenting only that it would not be practical to institute before resources could be obtained 
to allow for Romani language instruction all the way through university (Interview 3:5). The 
conflict, then, was less about the promotion of Romani language, which had already been 
standardized by Romanian Professor Gheorghe Sarău and subsequently popularized and 
incorporated into Roma politics, and more about the resources to properly implement it. 
In short, national Roma leaders and local activists in Romania do not struggle with 
ambiguity or scruples over linking their political agendas with aid. Linkages between NGOs and 
the government sector in regards to the Roma are a well-established fact in Romania. According 
to Vermeersch’s logic, then, Roma leaders in Romania have struck a balance in the 
representation of a stigmatized identity, effectively using strategic essentialism to juggle the need 
to express a unified Roma identity with the flexibility to help individual communities with 
different needs (Vermeersch 2005:468).  
The Romanian movement is not paralyzed by its foundation in multiculturalism. Nor is it 
paralyzed by the political opportunity structures, since there is considerable funding and 
institutional support for Roma projects. Yet as many sources point out, Roma politics in 
Romania remains unpopular on the grassroots level. The monopoly of the Roma Party is 
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sustained “though its relationship with the ruling party” rather than through the “broad support of 
the Roma population” (Denton 2003:13). In the research done by the National Democratic 
Institute in Romania on political support of Roma parties, a Roma observer is quoted saying of 
the Roma Party, “It is a party of local party presidents and vice presidents but few followers” 
(Denton 2003:17).  
Perhaps, following Vermeersch’s argument, the very linkage of aid discourse with 
identity politics through the networks of political leaders with humanitarian workers in Romania 
is proving to be an obstacle to popularity. This certainly seems to be the case with the lăutari of 
Romania, who do not wish to compromise their class identity and livelihoods by associating with 
stigmatized Gypsies. This does not seem to be an isolated instance in Romania, since the report 
of political participation in Romania insists that “better educated, more urban and financially 
successful Roma—and Roma of dual ethnicity—often identify themselves with either the 
majority ethnic group or a non- Roma minority (Denton 2003:9).  
The tendency of well-educated or wealthy Roma to cease to identify with that ethnicity 
was repeatedly brought up in my interviews with local leaders and elites. A government official 
stated that this was because the Roma movement has done little to disperse the connotations of 
poverty and illiteracy spouted by mass media in Romania (Interview 2:7). Notably, this man 
refused to identify as Roma himself, stating instead that he is a Romanian citizen who happens to 
be of partial Roma origin and takes an active interest in Roma issues through his work. A local 
leader in the Settlement added: 
The Roma person who goes to school doesn’t feel like coming back and have people 
yell at him. He doesn’t like coming down from where he is…. And why not admit it? 
They don’t see themselves as being those dirty people, because they feel ashamed to 
be like [Gypsies]. [Interview 3:6] 
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For this leader, and many others, it seemed that the association with stigma was a significant 
personal barrier to overcome in joining the Roma political movement, and continued to be a 
source of professional burnout.  
Yet these were issues raised by Roma elites, like those in Vermeersch’s study, and not by 
the poor Gypsies in my study. The latter have no scruples in linking Gypsyness with problems, 
or linking their political support to the willingness of leader to address issues such as poverty, 
unemployment, and marginalization. Those issues are the very basis of their political 
consciousness. How, then, can we understand the lack of support by non-elite Gypsies given the 
success of Roma leaders in pursuing advocacy and humanitarian aid?  
Connecting the local to the national 
I believe that the lack of decentralization in Romania seriously undermines the Roma 
political project’s legitimacy and effectiveness by ignoring local sources of authority and by 
maintaining a hierarchical structure within the Roma movement that does nothing to alleviate 
fears of corruption and favoritism. The lack of Gypsy support from poor communities comes at 
least partially from a critical reflection by these Gypsies of the weaknesses of politics in this 
region. 
The weaknesses of Roma politics in Romania, as pointed out by many of the people I 
talked to, align well with those pointed out by researchers on these issues. As one local leader 
pointed out in regards to Roma politicians, “they talk about brotherhood, but I haven’t seen it.” 
Instead, “they’re all fighting over power” (Interview 3:7). A woman who was in a position to 
join the Roma political movement at its inception opted to take the route of NGO work instead. 
“We didn’t participate because we knew about the people who were in [the Roma political 
movement] and what kind of people they were, like all the political people in Romania today” 
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(Interview 8:2). Acknowledging the importance of being affiliated with political parties, 
however, she compromised by officially putting her NGO under the sponsorship of the Roma 
Party (Interview 8). 
Reports on politics in Romania agree that there is a significant (and perhaps not 
unfounded) concern over corruption in politics in general and Roma politics specifically. 
Researchers suggest that individuals in Roma political parties “appear to advance the business 
interests of individual party leaders (which are often formed around the interests of a particular 
family business)” (Denton 2003:13). The survey team encountered many Gypsies who felt that 
Roma go into politics to make money. Cynically, the research team suggests that “from the 
number of late model luxury cars that the team observed among Romani political circles, it was 
not difficult to imagine why these remarks were made” (Denton 2003:13). 
In an interview with a regional Roma activist, the man noted the perversion of the 
affirmative action measures through corruption. Though he stated that he no longer thought this 
was an issue at the time of the interview, the man admitted that at beginning of affirmative action 
university policies toward Roma, corruption was an issue. Roma officials signed off on papers 
indicating that non-Roma students who wanted to occupy the designated Roma seats in 
departments were indeed Roma. These incidents were widely broadcast, bringing suspicion on 
the policies meant to integrate Roma and the leaders meant to advance this cause (Interview 1:7-
8). Luckily, after the news of these special opportunities traveled to Gypsy communities, real 
Roma origin candidates became the beneficiaries of those positions. 
The problem that corruption poses to popular Gypsy participation in the Roma movement 
was summed up to me in the following manner: 
For example, the Roma hear and see on television that the European Union, or the 
Romanian government has financed some programs for the Roma. Then they can ask, 
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"Okay, but where is our money?" Because this was money which was for the 
improvement of the situation of the Roma people in Romania, but the Roma 
communities don't feel that amount of money. And the quality of their life hasn't 
changed at all. [Interview 1:9] 
 
The people in the Settlement were certainly aware of the grants available for Roma projects, and 
could list a number of financiers offhand. Yet when I asked about whether this community has 
benefitted from any Roma projects, one Gypsy told me not to bring the topic up again. The fact 
that they watched the money designated for communities like them disappear between the 
national level and the local level, he explained, caused immense distrust and was an extremely 
sore point. 
Another person, who was in fact a beneficiary of PHARE funding for educational 
opportunities for Roma, related that she was extremely unhappy with the way the money was 
handled. “A lot of money that comes from outside, not only the PHARE project, goes for 
training teachers at conferences at expensive hotels– money with which they could actually do 
something else” (Interview 3:3). A regional government official similarly emphasized the 
importance of enough funds reaching the grassroots level to actually implement aid projects 
successfully: 
The funds are crucial because when you start to work in a community you create 
expectations and a lot of hope. And if you do not manage to get things changed then 
it’s a failure. There’s a big difference between you identifying a problem and getting a 
solution. [Interview 2:5] 
 
Overall, the prevalence of reports of aid that are not actually felt on the grassroots level help 
reinforce the disillusionment of Gypsies with Roma leaders in a noticeable way in Romania 
(Denton 2003:15). 
The Symbolic Power of Good Work on the local level 
Notably, the same reports that point to a lack of Roma interest in ethnic politics on the 
national level admit that “Roma tend to be more politically active at the local level” (Denton 
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2003:14). In 2003, there were 160 Roma who served as city councilors around the country, and 
all indications are that those numbers have kept increasing over the years (Denton 2003). I 
believe that the type of community leadership in the Settlement garnered significant respect from 
the Roma community. The constant display of good work and community involvement by 
leaders alleviated worries about corruption and self-interest. These Gypsies continually contrast 
their local leaders with national level leaders, reinforcing the popularity and legitimacy of those 
local leaders who have earned their right to represent the community rather than claiming that 
right from afar.  
Luckily for the Roma mobilization project, Romania is not faced with a complete 
disconnect between national-level party leaders and local Roma communities. The links exist, 
but they highly reliant on individuals rather than more official channels (Denton 2003:16). Thus, 
in communities where there is a popular local leader who is accepted on the municipal level, 
community interests can potentially be linked directly to national networks of influence. 
Despite this potential, the focus of national Roma leaders is on “representation in relation 
with the majority societies” at the expense of the acknowledgement of “internal arrangements of 
leadership and representation within the Romani community” (Klímová 2002:106). As a regional 
official told me: 
You need to refer also to the process of decentralization, which is very slow in 
Romania. I am personally in favor of the process where the decision is taken to the 
local level. This view is also supported by the present government... Still most of the 
decisions are central, and this generates frustration at the local level. So we are just 
one element of the chain in this… we receive both the frustrations from above and the 
frustrations from below. [Interview 2:5] 
 
The centralized character of the institutional framework of minority protection is a “fundamental 
problem” which “directly contributes to the lack of local empowerment” of Roma (Horvath and 
Scacco 2001:262).  
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 The lack of decentralization of the Roma movement reduces the accountability of national 
leaders to local Gypsies by obscuring the processes of leadership. Combined with the lack of 
established solidarity between Gypsies, helps explain why grassroots support of the Roma 
political project is largely absent. What is of political significance to local Gypsies is the work of 
local leaders who are in touch with their needs. When local Gypsies feel that a Roma leader is a 
part of their community and works for their community, they offer political support to that leader. 
The invisibility of long term, national-level change allow leaders not to be accountable to their 
constituency, whereas short term, local aid projects enforce accountability. As long as Roma 
leaders continue shoring up their national legitimacy with non-Gypsy forms of legitimacy at the 
expense of decentralization, Roma leadership on the national level will be seen as illegitimate, 
and will be unlikely to do well in elections. Clearly, the process of decentralization has already 
begun in Romania. But that process needs to be continued and networks of cooperation between 
micro-, meso-, and macro- level political interests need to be strengthened in order for 
marginalized Gypsy communities to join in the Roma movement.  
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